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3 QMUL Supreme Court Seminars 
 
1. Introduction 
Scope of the seminars: what is there still to discuss? 
Six seminars on the UK Supreme Court took place between January and June 2008 in the 
School of Law at Queen Mary, University of London. The participants were members of the 
judiciary, academics, legal practitioners and others (see Part 9). The topics for discussion were 
identified by a small working group during late 2007. By then, many aspects of the new court 
were already in place.  
 Part 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act, setting the basic legislative framework for the 
new court’s work, had been on the statute book since March 2005.  
 Building work at Middlesex Guildhall, the premises that will accommodate the new court, 
was underway.   
 The Draft Supreme Court Rules had been published in January 2007 by the Judicial 
Office of the House of Lords and the consultation period had come to an end in April 
2007. 
BOX 1 TIMELINE 
June 2003 Government announce their intention to create a UK Supreme Court 
February 2004 Constitutional Reform Bill introduced to Parliament 
December 2004 Government announce selection of  Middlesex Guildhall to house the court 
March 2005 Constitutional Reform Bill receives Royal Assent 
January 2007 Draft Rules of the UK Supreme Court Rules published for consultation 
April 2009 Rules of the Supreme Court to be submitted to the Lord Chancellor 
October 2009 UK Supreme Court opens for business 
 
During 2003-05, there was a great deal of political and academic debate about the merits or 
otherwise of creating a new court in the form envisaged by the Government. There was also 
was a considerable amount of official consultation. The Department for Constitutional 
Affairs, the House of Lords Committee on the Constitutional Reform Bill, the House of 
Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee, and the Justice 2 Committee of the Scottish 
Parliament all took written and oral evidence on the reasons for establishing a new court, its 
proposed structure and its likely impacts on the constitution. But as a Law Lord speaking at 
the first seminar said, these political exercises were inevitably ‘a rather blunt instrument’ and 
there remains a need for more detailed consultation and discussion on a range of issues 
relating to the work of the new court. 
The invitations to participants of the Queen Mary seminars explained the purpose of the 
discussions in this way: 
‘The overarching aim of the seminar series is to stimulate debate about the operation of the 
new Supreme Court, due to commence work in October 2009, by considering what aspects of 
current features and arrangements in the House of Lords work well and ought to be preserved 
when the jurisdiction is transferred to the new Court; and what changes and innovations 
ought to be considered. Given the blend of participants—academics, judges, practitioners, 
officials—the ideas that emerge are likely to range from the exploratory to the practical. It is 
hoped, however, that some of the views expressed may be taken into account in preparing for 
the opening of the Court.’ 
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The Chatham House rule 
The seminars were conducted under the Chatham House Rule. The discussion at the 
seminars was extraordinary frank and lively, no doubt in part at least because of the 
confidence inspired by the Chatham House Rule. This report keeps to the spirit of the Rule.    
Purpose of this report 
This report cannot hope to capture the full richness of the exchanges of views that took place 
during 12 hours of discussion. Each seminar began with three or four short presentations on 
the topics in hand followed by fairly free-flowing conversation. Nonetheless, given the 
importance and general public interest in the topics discussed, it was decided that a record 
should be made of the seminars. 
Readers with limited time who want to see the gist of the points that emerged during the 
seminars will find these summarised under the heading Key issues near the start of each part 
of the report. A list of questions, which call for discussion and debate, were identified during 
the seminars and are set out below. Some parts of the report end with suggested further 
reading for people who wish to delve deeper into the topics. 
For readers with more time, each part of the report goes on to set out more fully the threads 
of discussion during each seminar. The 50 or so people who attended some or all of the 
seminars were not invited according to any rigorous scientific selection process, so the views 
expressed do not purport to be representative in any proper sense of that term; the points to 
emerge from the discussions do however reflect a range of opinions on most questions. 
General themes 
Many points were considered during the conversations that took place at Queen Mary. From 
all of these it is possible to detect two broad themes. 
The first is the importance of effective communication. In years gone past, the higher courts 
spoke only through the words of their judgments. In more recent times, we recognise that 
courts are significant public institutions which ought to explain their constitutional role to the 
public. The importance of the UK Supreme Court’s website was referred to in several 
seminars—as a source of information for legal practitioners as well as interested citizens. We 
also debated questions about the format and style of judgment-writing in the new court. 
These are not new issues but they have been given a particular relevance (some participants 
argued) because the creation of a new court marks a moment in which change might take 
place. Other participants made a principled and pragmatic defence of current judgment-
writing practices. 
The second broad theme is the importance of the relationships between the UK Supreme 
Court and other courts and tribunals. No court is an island, entire of itself. We spoke at some 
length about the roles of the Court of Appeal in England and Wales and also that of the Inner 
House of the Court of Session in Scotland. There was considerable interest (though no 
consensus) in the ideas put forward—perhaps not new but certainly timely—that these 
intermediate courts of appeal might sit in panels of five or seven to determine appeals on some 
types of points of law of general public importance rather than expecting the UK Supreme 
Court to deal with them. The European dimension was also discussed, with interesting 
suggestions as to how the UK Supreme Court’s relationships with the European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Justice might develop in the years to come. 
Specific questions for discussion and debate 
In addition to these two broad themes, a series of more specific questions emerged during the 
course of the seminars. 
1. The current Practice Directions and Standing Orders of the House of Lords provide that 
‘Leave to appeal is granted to petitions that, in the opinion of the Appeal Committee, raise an 
arguable point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the House at 
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this time, bearing in mind that the matter will already have been the subject of judicial decision and 
may have already been reviewed on appeal. A petition which in the opinion of the Appeal 
Committee does not raise such a point of law is refused on that ground.’ 
Is this formulation sufficient or should the criteria for permission be set out more fully? 
2. Should reasons be given (a) for the refusal and (b) for the grant of permission? 
3. Should the practice of permission in each case being determined by three Law Lords 
continue in the UK Supreme Court or would there be benefits in involving a larger 
number of Justices in the process? 
4. Should the UK Supreme Court receive submissions from third party interveners at the 
permission stage? 
5. Should the UK Supreme Court receive fuller submissions from respondents at the 
permission stage? 
6. Should appeals from the Inner House of the Court of Session be made subject to a general 
requirement of permission? 
7. What information about pending petitions for permission, and appeals awaiting hearing, 
should be contained on the UK Supreme Court website? 
8. Would there be benefits in the intermediate courts of appeal sitting more routinely in 
panels of five, seven, or even nine to determine questions of law? 
9. In relation to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in England and Wales, the 
Administration of Justice Act 1960 provides that a pre-condition to granting permission is 
that the Court certifies that ‘a point of law of general public importance is involved in the 
decision and it appears to that court ..., that the point is one which ought to be considered 
by the Supreme Court’. 
a. Should this be repealed on the basis that it is undesirable for a court to have a 
veto over appeals from its judgments? 
b. Should this be applied more vigorously, with emphasis on the criterion that 
‘the point is one which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court’?  
10. What, if any, changes should be made to the arrangements for selecting panels of Justices 
to hear appeals?  
11. Should the UK Supreme Court sit more regularly in panels of seven or nine or even 
eleven? What criteria should determine which cases are heard by larger panels? 
12.  Are there changes in practice and procedure that could be introduced to help reduce the 
high costs of making an appeal? 
13. What provision should there be for protective costs orders in the UK Supreme Court? 
14. Would it be helpful to have a mechanism whereby the UK Supreme Court could flag up 
questions to be included in the Law Commissions’ programmes of work?  
15. Should the UK Supreme Court adopt the same approach to writing judgments as 
currently applies in the House of Lords? Should a single judgment of the court be adopted 
more frequently? 
16. Should a press release summarising of each judgment be released? 
17. Should proceedings of the UK Supreme Court be (a) webcast via the Court’s website and 
(b) made available to broadcasters? 
18. When making references to the European Court of Justice for preliminary rulings, should 
the UK Supreme Court adopt a practice of indicating its provisional view of the question? 
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2. The legislative framework for the UK 
Supreme Court 
The aim of this part of the report is to set out the framework within which the UK Supreme 
Court will operate.   
Key issues 
 Part 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 provides the basic statutory framework for 
the work of the UK Supreme Court but it is neither immutable (some amendments are 
already being considered) nor comprehensive (rights of appeal are defined in several other 
Acts of Parliament). 
 Draft Rules of the UK Supreme Court were published for consultation in January 2007. 
The Law Lords and officials in the Ministry of Justice continue to work on the Rules; 
while they are not entirely set in stone, the time to be suggesting wholesale re-writing (if 
anyone is minded to do this) is past. The Senior Law Lord will pass the Rules to the Lord 
Chancellor by April 2009 and they will take the form of a statutory instrument.  
 Great importance must be attached to the statutory requirements that the Supreme Court 
Rules be ‘accessible, fair and efficient’ and ‘simple and simply expressed’. 
 Many features of the day-to-day working practices of the UK Supreme Court will be 
covered by Practice Directions (to be published at the same time as the Rules). 
 The internal working practices adopted by the Justices of the UK Supreme Court will also 
be important. 
 Other informal aspects of the UK Supreme Court’s operations—notably the court’s 
website and public access to the building—also need to be considered. 
Jurisdiction 
The UK Supreme Court is established in law by Part 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 
2005. Section 23, which creates the UK Supreme Court, will be brought into force when ‘the 
Lord Chancellor is satisfied that the Supreme Court will at that time be provided with 
accommodation in accordance with written plans that he has approved’ (section 148). This is 
expected to be at the start of October 2009.  
The jurisdiction of the UK Supreme Court is defined partly by Part 3 of the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005 and in part by several other Acts of Parliament. During the seminars two 
possible amendments on the horizon were identified (see further Part 7): 
 The possibility that section 40(3) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005—‘An appeal lies 
to the Court from any order or judgment of a court in Scotland if an appeal lay from that 
court to the House of Lords at or immediately before the commencement of this 
section’—may be amended if at some point in the future it is decided that appeals from 
the Inner House of the Court of Session should be subject to a general requirement that 
permission is granted before an appeal is made (as it is for appeals from the courts of 
England and Wales and Northern Ireland). 
 The possibility that section 57 of the Scotland Act 1998, which confers jurisdiction over 
‘devolution issues’ on the UK Supreme Court, may be amended if the Commission on 
Scottish Devolution under the chairmanship of Sir Kenneth Calman recommends 
adjustment to the basis on which appeals on Convention rights from the Scottish courts, 
especially in the criminal justice context, are handled. 
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The appointments process for Supreme Court Justices was not considered in the seminars, 
but it may be noted that in March 2008 the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill proposed 
amendments to the arrangements established by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 by 
removing the entirely formal role of the Prime Minister from the process. 
Appeal routes to the Supreme Court 
The UK Supreme Court is a creature of statute. Rights of appeal to the court exist only in so 
far as they are created by an Act of Parliament. There are various routes by which an appellant 
may seek to come to the court. These differ according to whether the case started in England 
and Wales, in Northern Ireland, or in Scotland. There are also different arrangements 
depending on whether the appeal is in a criminal or civil case. Some of these differences were 
regarded by some participants in the Queen Mary seminars as unjustified and in need of 
reform; any change would require changes to primary legislation. 
Appeals from the courts of England and Wales 
The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 section 40(2) creates a right of appeal in civil cases from 
the courts of England and Wales and section 40(6) qualifies that right by requiring that 
permission must be given either by the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court (Box 2). 
BOX 2 CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ACT 2005  
Section 40 Jurisdiction 
(1) The Supreme Court is a superior court of record. 
(2) An appeal lies to the Court from any order or judgment of the Court of Appeal in England and 
Wales in civil proceedings. 
(3) An appeal lies to the Court from any order or judgment of a court in Scotland if an appeal lay from 
that court to the House of Lords at or immediately before the commencement of this section. 
(4) Schedule 9— 
(a) transfers other jurisdiction from the House of Lords to the Court, 
(b) transfers devolution jurisdiction from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to the Court, and 
(c) makes other amendments relating to jurisdiction. 
(5) The Court has power to determine any question necessary to be determined for the purposes of 
doing justice in an appeal to it under any enactment. 
(6) An appeal under subsection (2) lies only with the permission of the Court of Appeal or the 
Supreme Court; but this is subject to provision under any other enactment restricting such an appeal. 
Criminal appeals from the courts of England and Wales are governed by other legislation (Box 
3). The Criminal Appeal Act 1968 section 33 creates a qualified right of appeal from the 
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) to the UK Supreme Court.1 There is a double hurdle.  
 First, the Court of Appeal must certify that there is ‘a point of law of general public 
importance’ and the point is ‘one that ought to be considered by the Supreme Court’.  
 Secondly, either the Court of Appeal or the UK Supreme Court must grant permission.  
As we discuss in Parts 3 and 4, some participants in the Queen Mary seminars questioned 
whether there is any need for this double hurdle in criminal cases and suggested that the 
certification stage should be removed. Others, however, contended that the certification stage 
could in future provide a basis for a greater number of cases being dealt with by the Court of 
Appeal (Criminal Division) sitting in larger panels than at present. 
                                                 
1 All legislation in this part is presented as if the amendments contained in schedule 9 to the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 are in force. Those amendments not already in force will be brought 
into force before the UK Supreme Court opens for business in October 2009. 
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BOX 3 CRIMINAL APPEAL ACT 1968 
Part II Appeal to Supreme Court from Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 
Section 33 Right of appeal to Supreme Court 
(1) An appeal lies to the Supreme Court, at the instance of the defendant or the prosecutor, from any 
decision of the Court of Appeal on an appeal to that court under Part I of this Act or section 9 
(preparatory hearings) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 or section 35 of the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996. 
(2) The appeal lies only with the leave of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court; and leave shall 
not be granted unless it is certified by the Court of Appeal that a point of law of general public 
importance is involved in the decision and it appears to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court (as 
the case may be) that the point is one which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court. 
(3) Except as provided by this Part of this Act and section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 
(appeal in cases of contempt of court), no appeal shall lie from any decision of the criminal division of 
the Court of Appeal. 
In two circumstances, there is a possibility of an appeal to the UK Supreme Court directly 
from the High Court, bypassing the Court of Appeal.  
 The first situation is a so-called ‘leapfrog appeal’ made in civil cases under the terms of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1969 (Box 4A). Although not greatly used —there was one 
appeal to the House of Lords via this route in 2006; four in 2007— leapfrog appeals may 
be useful where an important point of statutory interpretation arises and it seems clear 
that the Court of Appeal will be bound by a precedent of the House of Lords/UK 
Supreme Court. 
 The second is under the Administration of Justice Act 1960 in relation to ‘a criminal cause 
or matter’ (Box 4B). The High Court deals mainly with civil cases but aspects of the work 
of the Administrative Court relate to challenges to the legality of decisions taken during 
the criminal justice process. In such cases the High Court will normally sit as a ‘Divisional 
Court’ of two judges rather a single judge. These proceedings include: judicial review 
claims against magistrates’ courts determinations and some decisions of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions; ‘appeals by way of case stated’ from magistrates’ courts; and some 
applications for the writ of habeas corpus. 
BOX 4A ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ACT 1969 
Section 12 Grant of certificate by trial judge 
(1) Where on the application of any of the parties to any proceedings to which this section applies the 
judge is satisfied— 
(a) that the relevant conditions are fulfilled in relation to his decision in those proceedings, and 
(b) that a sufficient case for an appeal to the Supreme Court under this Part of this Act has been 
made out to justify an application for leave to bring such an appeal, and 
(c) that all the parties to the proceedings consent to the grant of a certificate under this section, 
the judge, subject to the following provisions of this Part of this Act, may grant a certificate to that 
effect. 
(2) This section applies to any civil proceedings in the High Court which are either— 
(a) proceedings before a single judge of the High Court (including a person acting as such a judge 
under section 3 of the Judicature Act 1925), or 
(c) proceedings before a Divisional Court. 
(3) Subject to any Order in Council made under the following provisions of this section, for the 
purposes of this section the relevant conditions, in relation to a decision of the judge in any 
proceedings, are that a point of law of general public importance is involved in that decision and that 
that point of law either— 
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(a) relates wholly or mainly to the construction of an enactment or of a statutory instrument, and has 
been fully argued in the proceedings and fully considered in the judgment of the judge in the 
proceedings, or 
(b) is one in respect of which the judge is bound by a decision of the Court of Appeal or of the 
Supreme Court in previous proceedings, and was fully considered in the judgments given by the 
Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court (as the case may be) in those previous proceedings. 
(4) Any application for a certificate under this section shall be made to the judge immediately after he 
gives judgment in the proceedings: 
Provided that the judge may in any particular case entertain any such application made at any later 
time before the end of the period of fourteen days beginning with the date on which that judgment is 
given or such other period as may be prescribed by rules of court. 
(5) No appeal shall lie against the grant or refusal of a certificate under this section. 
(6) Her Majesty may by Order in Council amend subsection (3) of this section by altering, deleting, or 
substituting one or more new paragraphs for, either or both of paragraphs (a) and (b) of that 
subsection, or by adding one or more further paragraphs. 
(7) Any Order in Council made under this section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a 
resolution of either House of Parliament. 
(8) In this Part of this Act ―civil proceedings‖ means any proceedings other than proceedings in a 
criminal cause or matter, and ―the judge‖, in relation to any proceedings to which this section applies, 
means the judge . . . referred to in paragraph (a) . . . of subsection (2) of this section, or the Divisional 
Court referred to in paragraph (c) of that subsection, as the case may be. 
Section 13 Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court 
(1) Where in any proceedings the judge grants a certificate under section 12 of this Act, then, at any 
time within one month from the date on which that certificate is granted or such extended time as in 
any particular case the Supreme Court may allow, any of the parties to the proceedings may make an 
application to the Supreme Court under this section. 
(2) Subject to the following provisions of this section, if on such an application it appears to the 
Supreme Court to be expedient to do so, the Supreme Court may grant leave for an appeal to be 
brought directly to the Supreme Court; and where leave is granted under this section— 
(a) no appeal from the decision of the judge to which the certificate relates shall lie to the Court of 
Appeal, but 
(b) an appeal shall lie from that decision to the Supreme Court. 
(3) Applications under this section shall be determined without a hearing. 
 
BOX 4B ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ACT 1960  
Section 1 Right of appeal in criminal cases 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court, at the instance 
of the defendant or the prosecutor,— 
(a) from any decision of  the High Court in a criminal cause or matter. 
(2) No appeal shall lie under this section except with the leave of the court below or of the Supreme 
Court; and such leave shall not be granted unless it is certified by the court below that a point of law 
of general public importance is involved in the decision and it appears to that court or to the Supreme 
Court, as the case may be, that the point is one which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court. 
(4) For the purpose of disposing of an appeal under this section the Supreme Court may exercise any 
powers of the court below or may remit the case to that court. 
(5) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, ―leave to appeal‖ means leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court under this section. 
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Section 2 Application for leave to appeal 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an application to the court below for leave to appeal shall 
be made within the period of fourteen days beginning with the date of the decision of that court; and 
an application to the Supreme Court for such leave shall be made within the period of fourteen days 
beginning with the date on which the application is refused by the court below. 
(3) Except in a case involving sentence of death, the Supreme Court or the court below may, upon 
application made at any time by the defendant, extend the time within which an application may be 
made by him to the Supreme Court or the court below under subsection (1) of this section. 
Appeals from the courts of Northern Ireland 
The Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978—the principal piece of legislation governing the 
structure of the court system in Northern Ireland—creates routes of appeal from the Northern 
Ireland Court of Appeal to the UK Supreme Court in criminal matters and civil matters (Box 
5). The ‘leapfrog appeal’ provisions under the Administration of Justice Act 1969 also apply 
(Box 4A). 
BOX 5 JUDICATURE (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1978 
Section 41 Appeals to the Supreme Court in other criminal matters 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court, at the instance 
of the defendant or the prosecutor,— 
(a) from any decision of the High Court in a criminal cause or matter; 
(b) from any decision of the Court of Appeal in a criminal cause or matter upon a case stated by a 
county court or a magistrates‖ court. 
(2) No appeal shall lie under this section except with the leave of the court below or of the Supreme 
Court; and, subject to section 45(3), such leave shall not be granted unless it is certified by the court 
below that a point of law of general public importance is involved in the decision and it appears to that 
court or to the Supreme Court, as the case may be, that the point is one which ought to be considered 
by that House. 
(4) For the purpose of disposing of an appeal under this section the Supreme Court may exercise any 
powers of the court below or may remit the case to that court. 
(5) Schedule 1 shall have effect in relation to appeals under this section. 
(6) In this section, sections 44 and 45 and Schedule 1— 
(a) any reference to the defendant shall be construed— 
(i) in relation to proceedings for an offence, and in relation to an application for an order of 
mandamus, prohibition or certiorari in connection with such proceedings, as a reference to the person 
who was or would have been the defendant in those proceedings; 
(ii) in relation to any proceedings or order for or in respect of contempt of court, as a reference to the 
person against whom the proceedings were brought or the order was made; 
(iii) in relation to a criminal application for habeas corpus, as a reference to the person by or in 
respect of whom that application was made, 
and any reference to the prosecutor shall be construed accordingly; 
(b) ―application for habeas corpus‖ means an application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 
and references to a criminal application or civil application shall be construed accordingly as the 
application does or does not constitute a criminal cause or matter; 
(c) ―leave to appeal‖ means leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under this section; 
(d) an appeal under this section shall be treated as pending until any application for leave to appeal is 
disposed of and, if leave to appeal is granted, until the appeal is disposed of and an application for 
leave to appeal shall be treated as disposed of at the expiration of the time within which it may be 
made, if it is not made within that time. 
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 Section 42  Appeals the Supreme Court in civil cases 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and to any restriction imposed by any statutory provision 
which has effect by virtue of subsection (6), an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any order 
or judgment of the Court of Appeal in any civil cause or matter. 
(2) No appeal shall lie under this section except with the leave of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme 
Court. 
(6) No appeal from an order or judgment of the Court of Appeal shall, unless it involves a decision of 
any question as to the validity of any provision made by or under an Act of the Parliament of Northern 
Ireland or a Measure of the Northern Ireland Assembly, lie under this section in a case where by any 
statutory provision, including a provision of this Act, it is expressly provided (whatever form of words is 
used) that that order or judgment is to be final. 
Section 43 Appeals to the Supreme Court from High Court 
Nothing in this Part of this Act affects the operation of Part II of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 
(which provides that an appeal from the High Court shall in certain circumstances lie direct to the 
Supreme Court).  
Routes of appeal from the Scottish courts are discussed in Part 7. 
The Supreme Court Rules 
Section 45 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 governs the making of the Supreme Court 
Rules (Box 6). Draft Supreme Court Rules were published in January 2007 and the 
consultation period came to an end in April 2007.2 During 2009, the Rules will be published 
in the form of a statutory instrument. 
BOX 6: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ACT 2005  
Section 45 Making of rules 
(1) The President of the Supreme Court may make rules (to be known as ―Supreme Court Rules‖) 
governing the practice and procedure to be followed in the Court. 
(2) The power to make Supreme Court Rules includes power to make different provision for different 
cases, including different provision— 
(a) for different descriptions of proceedings, or 
(b) for different jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
(3) The President must exercise the power to make Supreme Court Rules with a view to securing 
that— 
(a) the Court is accessible, fair and efficient, and 
(b) the rules are both simple and simply expressed. 
(4) Before making Supreme Court Rules the President must consult all of the following— 
(a) the Lord Chancellor; 
(b) the bodies listed in subsection (5); 
(c) such other bodies that represent persons likely to be affected by the Rules as the 
President considers it appropriate to consult. 
(5) The bodies referred to in subsection (4)(b) are— 
The General Council of the Bar of England and Wales; 
The Law Society of England and Wales; 
The Faculty of Advocates of Scotland; 
                                                 
2 http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/SupremeCourt_rulesconsultation.pdf (accessed 4 
November 2008). 
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The Law Society of Scotland; 
The General Council of the Bar of Northern Ireland; 
The Law Society of Northern Ireland. 
Practice Directions and internal working methods 
Behind the Rules of the Supreme Court there will be Practice Directions. These will not take 
the form of delegated legislation but they are being drafted in tandem with the Rules. A Law 
Lord involved in the design of the Rules and Practice Directions told that seminar that 
accessibility will be important in each of these categories of rules.  
There will also be areas of practice—working methods—which will be essentially inward 
looking at how Justices carry on their work. The Law Lord described these as ‘open ground’ 
in respect of which there is search for ideas. He felt that the six seminars were a unique 
opportunity to gather views. However, he stressed that it would be for the Justices to decide 
their business. He said they would listen with open minds and share their thoughts but 
ultimately the responsibility was theirs. 
The Law Lord noted that section 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 states that the 
Lord Chancellor must uphold the continued independence of the judiciary. The Law Lord 
viewed judicial independence not just as a collective phenomenon but as a principle which 
attaches to each individual member of the judiciary. He also noted that section 27 of the 2005 
Act states that selection for appointment must be on merit. He said that the consequence of 
these two provisions was that no members of the judiciary can or should be dictated to by 
anyone. He believed that the strength of the argument would be important in deciding what 
changes to make to working practices. 
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3. Case selection for the UK Supreme Court 
This part of the report considers questions relating to the ways in which the UK Supreme 
Court will select which cases should be go continue to full argument and judgment. The focus 
is on civil appeals from England and Wales. Criminal appeals are considered in Part 4 and 
appeals from Scotland in Part 7. 
Key issues identified in the seminar 
 Should the creation of the UK Supreme Court prompt any change in the criteria on which 
permission to appeal is determined? Leaving aside criminal appeals from England and 
Wales and possible developments in Scotland, no arguments were advanced for any 
significant changes. Some participants did however foresee a time when the UK Supreme 
Court’s case load would be dominated by public law appeals. 
 Should the criteria for permission be set out with more fully and formally? Opinion was 
divided as the benefits of such a change. Some participants favoured this—either expressly 
in the UK Supreme Court Rules or by a process of publishing reasons in individual 
cases—on grounds of transparency and accessibility. Others argued that flexibility was 
important. 
 When, if at all, should reasons be given for the grant and refusal of permission? A range of 
views was expressed on this question—some participants confessing that they had changed 
their mind during the course of the discussion. 
 What arrangements should the UK Supreme Court make for publishing information 
about permission applications received and their outcomes? This is considered further in 
Part 6. 
 To what extent should the intermediate courts of appeal continue to be able to grant 
permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court? The Court of Appeal in England and 
Wales may grant permission but does so only sparingly. Some participants argued that in 
all cases decisions about which cases to accept for appeal should be for the UK Supreme 
Court alone; others took the view that there are practical benefits in the arrangement 
which enables would-be appellants to seek permission first from the Court of Appeal. 
 Should the practice of three Law Lords deciding applications for permission continue, or 
should a larger number—perhaps all—Justices be involved? The seminar was reminded of 
arrangements in the US Supreme Court, where all nine Justices are involved in selecting 
any case. If current practices in the House of Lords continue to be used in the UK 
Supreme Court, it was suggested that better systems of communication should be adopted 
to enable all Justices to have information about the petitions that have been lodged and 
which have been granted. 
 There was discussion about the possible advantages of appointing one of the Justices to 
have a role of ‘rapporteur’ for each case; it was suggested that this might assist with case 
management. Some participants were unconvinced about the benefits of case management 
at the level of the Supreme Court. 
 A number of comments were made about the need to reform permission arrangements in 
relation to the overseas jurisdictions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The 
Justices of the UK Supreme Court, like the Law Lords before them, will hear a significant 
number of such appeals each year, in the specially designated courtroom within Middlesex 
Guildhall. 
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Background 
Most—but not all—rights of appeal to the UK Supreme Court will be subject to a ‘leave’ or 
‘permission’ requirement (the terms are interchangeable): either the UK Supreme Court itself 
or a lower court will act as a gate-keeper, determining which would-be appeals receive a full 
hearing resulting in a judgment. Different arrangements apply to Scottish appeals and these 
are considered in Part 7. 
The UK Supreme Court will, like the House of Lords, therefore have considerable scope to 
select which of the cases brought to it should be subject to full hearing and judgment. In 
recent years, the House of Lords has rejected far more petitions for appeal than it has allowed 
to proceed.  
 Petitions for leave to appeal determined Number allowed 
2005 255 79 (40%) 
2006 198 45 (23%) 
2007 199 53 (27%) 
The criteria for permission are currently set out in the Practice Direction and Standing Orders 
of the House of Lords: 
Leave to appeal is granted to petitions that, in the opinion of the Appeal Committee, raise an arguable 
point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the House at this time, 
bearing in mind that the matter will already have been the subject of judicial decision and may have 
already been reviewed on appeal. A petition which in the opinion of the Appeal Committee does not 
raise such a point of law is refused on that ground. 
The criteria for permission 
A Law Lord gave a short presentation to the seminar in which he summarised the current 
position. Cases are selected if they raise a point of law which is (i) likely to affect significantly 
a fair number of people or (ii) is of general public importance, significance or interest. The 
point of law must be one which (iii) needs clarification, (iv) may need to be changed, (v) 
involves inconsistency with other decisions, or (vi) simply requires the authority of the Law 
Lords. Bearing in mind the other currently listed appeals, the case must be (vii) suitable on its 
facts and (viii) justified in view of other pressures. 
The Law Lord said that there was a case for saying that, at least in general terms, the current 
approach should not be changed in the UK Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was not 
created to make substantive change and the judicial resources will be identical. Whether, and 
if so the extent to which, the approach of the Supreme Court should differ from that of the 
House of Lords will depend in part on other decisions affecting the resources of the court—
how many Justices should sit on appeals, how many days a year the court will sit, whether oral 
hearings become shorter and whether there is a reduction in the case load of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council. 
Which courts should decide whether to grant permission?  
An academic argued that, with one or two minor exceptions, the responsibility for 
determining the caseload of the Supreme Court should be the Court’s alone—and not a role 
for the lower courts. The experience of the House of Lords shows that a 12-judge Supreme 
Court could comfortably handle 60 to 70 cases a year, which is not out of line with the 
caseload of, say, the Supreme Court of Canada, the High Court of Australia or the US 
Supreme Court. This may mean that the Court will have to spend more time considering 
petitions for leave to appeal, but this additional time could be off-set by reducing the number 
of appeals heard by the Justices when sitting in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
To achieve that reduction, new leave requirements would need to be introduced for such 
appeals. These requirements do not need to be identical to those for Supreme Court appeals. 
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The time required to consider such leave petitions would be much less than that required to 
hear the appeals themselves. 
A Law Lord took a different view, arguing that the Court of Appeal should retain the power to 
grant permission to appeal; he did not feel that it is a power that is over-exercised.  
A practitioner agreed. He said that if a party loses before the Court of Appeal, applying to the 
Court of Appeal for permission to appeal to the House of Lords/ Supreme Court is a cheap 
way of ‘having another go’. He noted that permission is nearly always refused. He considered 
that if in the future the Court of Appeal did not have the power to grant leave to appeal, more 
litigants will want to petition the Supreme Court, which would lead to costs for the litigant 
and the taking up of resources in the Supreme Court.  
The giving of reasons  
An academic called for the permission criteria to be set out with greater precision and reasons 
to be given for granting and refusing permission. He suggested that setting out the permission 
criteria with greater precision is important for practitioners in determining whether an appeal 
is likely to be entertained. Moreover, articulating reasons for which cases are selected and 
rejected would enable the court to explain its role more effectively to the public. In respect of 
giving reasons, the reasons need not be long, but they should convey the rationale for why a 
particular case was selected or not selected. The reasons should be readily accessible on the 
Supreme Court website. This increased transparency would facilitate better targeted 
interventions from third parties. 
A Court of Appeal judge expressed the view that where an application is granted, no reasons 
should be given. He considered that where an application is refused, reasons should also be 
given. Reasons could be short but they should be less formulaic and more case-specific than 
the current criteria. He commented that the losing party, the lawyers, and the public all need 
to know why a petition is refused, and that it is also helpful for both future appellants and for 
the judges themselves. He also suggested that there could be a procedure for a review of the 
petition if it is refused. There should be the facility to have an oral hearing if the judges think 
it is appropriate to do so. Refusals should be publicly available on the Court’s website, which 
should also set out the petitions granted with a summary of the issues. 
Another judge took a different view, arguing that a litigant should be entitled to know why 
permission is granted because taking the case to the Supreme Court will cost a lot of money. 
He gave an example of a case which was taken to the House of Lords when it was not clear to 
the respondent why it was going there and was ultimately faced with a £90,000 costs order. 
He thought it was important to be thinking about why leave is being granted and also who is 
going to pay for it. 
An academic argued that the Supreme Court should be more detailed than the House of 
Lords in the reasons it gives for granting or refusing permission to appeal—which presupposes 
that it needs to develop new criteria against which to assess petitions for leave. These criteria 
should in turn reflect the purposes for which the Supreme Court exists. The Supreme Court 
should not be (or, at least, very rarely be) merely a court of error, correcting ‘wrong’ decisions 
made by lower courts. That is a function which can be performed by the lower tier of appeal 
courts. The Supreme Court is there to ensure: (a) that legal rules with significant impact on 
individuals and/or parts of society are clear and just; (b) that there is relative uniformity 
between the laws applying in different parts of the United Kingdom; (c) that there is relative 
consistency between different branches of the law (criminal and civil; public and private; 
substantive and procedural); and (d) that, where appropriate, there is relative harmony with 
the legal solutions adopted by other countries or by international courts. Judgments in the 
Supreme Court should be fuller, more contextual, more comparative, more ‘legal’ than 
judgments in any lower court. 
A Law Lord expressed interest in the idea of fuller reasons. It is not the job of the Lords to 
correct errors of law. The Law Lords —and in future the Justices of the Supreme Court—
would be able to deduce more principled ways of going about things if they gave reasons. But 
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the question needed to be posed whether it is dangerous to give reasons for granting leave: a 
litigant who is granted leave for the reason that the decision was right but the reasoning was 
hopeless might not want to pursue the appeal any further. 
A practitioner said that he had come to the seminar thinking that reasons for refusing leave to 
appeal should be given; now he was not so sure. He considered that the role of the Supreme 
Court should not be merely to correct decisions of the court below, so he felt that care should 
be taken to avoid litigants seeing reasons for refusal of permission as a substitution of the 
decision below. He also felt that it would be difficult to define criteria in advance and that 
perhaps it would be better to work on a case by case basis 
Procedure and practice points 
A practitioner questioned the provision in the Draft Supreme Court Rules that ‘No 
application may be made to intervene in support of an application for permission to appeal’. 
He suggested that there might be cases where neither party represents a public interest but 
third parties do. 
A Law Lord said that petitions should continue to be on paper. However he considered that 
perhaps respondents could be encouraged, more than they are at the moment, to make 
written submissions. He also considered whether the petitions should just be considered by 
three judges. He noted that in the US, all nine Justices consider applications. He commented 
that if it remains with three judges, it is important that all the judges are aware of all the 
petitions and applications and that they have the opportunity to see the petitions and make 
representations. He also considered that perhaps any differences in views between the three 
judges should be spelt out. 
Another Law Lord thought that it might be appropriate to consider giving directions, such as 
a time estimate, at the permission stage. He thought that it would make sense to have a Justice 
to act as case manager or judge rapporteur to identify which judges and also the number of 
judges that should hear a case. 
A different Law Lord agreed that it will be desirable for the Justices of the Supreme Court to 
have more information about the petitions that have been received, which are pending, and so 
on. 
A practitioner commented that he is troubled by the granting of permission when the result 
was correct but the reasons were not, because the litigant would be arguing a case that was 
already won, that the Supreme Court thinks will win, but the Court wants to tidy up the 
reasoning. He asked whether the Court could say in advance that the case will be heard but 
that the decision will not be changed. 
Further reading  
B Dickson, ‘The Processing of Appeals in the House of Lords” (2007) 123 Law Quarterly 
Review 57 
G Drewry, L Blom-Cooper and C Blake, The Court of Appeal (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2007) chs 5-6 
A Le Sueur, ‘Panning for Gold: Choosing Cases for Top-level Courts’, ch 12 in A Le Sueur 
(ed), Building the UK’s New Supreme Court: National and Comparative Perspectives 
(Oxford: OUP 2004) 
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4. Relations with lower courts and tribunals 
Key issues identified in the seminars 
 Whether the Court of Appeal in England and Wales should sit more often in panels of five 
or seven judges—rather than the normal three—to decide significant cases, so reducing the 
need for appeals to progress to the UK Supreme Court. Several participants expressed 
support for such a development. A similar point in relation to the Inner House of the 
Court of Session is considered in Part 7. 
 This idea was considered, in particular, in relation to the Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) because, on one view, that recent expertise in criminal law contained in that 
court was more likely to lead to certainty in the law compared to judgments of the UK 
Supreme Court. For this reason, some participants in the seminar favoured a change to 
current arrangements so that the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) should not 
normally grant a ‘certificate’ (a precondition to granting permission in criminal appeals) 
unless the appeal had been considered by a panel of five or seven Lords Justice. Other 
participants took a different view, arguing that the whole certification requirement should 
be abolished as it in effect allows the court to be appealed from a veto over possible 
appeals—an arrangement that they saw as objectionable in principle. 
 There is an obvious need for effective communication, including through clear judgments 
that are as short as possible. (This issue is considered further in Part 6). 
Practical problems 
In opening remarks to the seminar, a Law Lord said that in his experience there were two 
main areas of concern about the House of Lords. One was that the speeches in House of 
Lords cases were too long, there were too many of them in each case, and they were 
sometimes difficult to reconcile with each other. Secondly, there had sometimes been a failure 
to deal urgently with the few appeals that truly did require expedition. He favoured the Court 
of Appeal in England and Wales sitting in panels of five or seven more often to resolve 
difficult points of law. He also favoured the UK Supreme Court hearing fewer appeals, sitting 
in larger panels, to avoid the 3:2 divisions that sometimes arose under current arrangements. 
The distinct roles of the Court of Appeal and the UK Supreme Court 
In a presentation to the seminar, an academic said that the UK Supreme Court would have a 
‘review’ function (correcting erroneous decisions in the courts below) and a ‘supervision’ 
function (developing broad principles on important points of law). Like the House of Lords, it 
could be assumed that the overwhelmingly predominant function of the UK Supreme Court 
will be one of supervision.  
It was important to remember that very few cases are allowed to progress to the highest court, 
so the Courts of Appeal in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland and the Inner House 
of the Court of Session in Scotland are in practice the courts of last resort for most categories 
of case.  The ‘supervisory’ role of the UK Supreme Court will also filter downwards to all 
courts, including tribunals and magistrates’ courts in which there is lay participation. This 
raises the issue of the importance of good, clear communication. 
The academic noted that 40 years ago, the Court of Appeal in England and Wales granted 
leave to appeal to the House of Lords in a high proportion of cases but now, in most cases, the 
Court of Appeal leaves this decision to the House of Lords (and presumably, in the future, to 
the UK Supreme Court).  
The subject matter of cases selected for hearing in the House of Lords has changed markedly 
over time. Forty years ago a large proportion of the appeals that went to the House of Lords 
were tax cases. More recently the House of Lords has moved in the direction of a public law 
court. He questioned whether the UK Supreme Court will become a constitutional court. 
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The spadework done in the courts below will be important for the effective working of the UK 
Supreme Court. The facts of the cases are already established in the courts below. He noted 
the existence of the ‘leapfrog’ appeal procedure (see Box 4A above) and commented that 
although they speed up the process, they do not allow for the refinement of legal argument in 
the Court of Appeal. 
Criminal appeals 
Background: the double requirement of a certificate before permission 
The Administration of Justice Act 1960 (see Box 4B above) abolished the previous 
requirement that the Attorney General would grant a ‘fiat’ as a precondition to an appeal in 
criminal matters to the House of Lords. The threshold criterion was reduced from an 
‘exceptional’ to a ‘general’ point of law of public importance. The requirement of 
exceptionality had resulted in very few criminal appeals being heard by the House of Lords: 
just 23 appeals in the period 1907-1960. The 1960 Act also created avenues of appeal in 
criminal matters from the Divisional Court. 
A proposal for criminal appeals in England and Wales 
A Court of Appeal judge urged that there should be radical re-think about the role of the UK 
Supreme Court in relation to criminal appeals from England and Wales.  He noted that Sir 
Robin Auld’s review of the Criminal Courts in 2001 had not addressed the issue. There were 
currently two preconditions for a criminal appeal heard by the Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) receiving a second appeal by the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court. First, a 
certificate must be issued by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) that the appeal involves 
a ‘point of law of general public importance’ and ‘the point ought to be considered by the 
House of Lords’. The judge argued that too many cases were certified by the Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division). This was because there is too much focus on the first element often 
overlooking the second element of the test. Secondly, leave to appeal must be granted either 
by the Court of Appeal or the UK Supreme Court (see above Box 3 in respect of the Court of 
Appeal and Box4B in respect of Divisional Courts).  
The judge said that some of the Law Lords, and in future the Justices of the UK Supreme 
Court, will have no criminal justice experience and none will have recent criminal justice 
experience. There are numerous areas of law which will have changed since Supreme Court 
Justices will have sat as a criminal trial judge—changes in recent years have affected the way in 
which a criminal trial judges exercise their discretion; the changes include hearsay, character, 
vulnerable witnesses and case management.  
The experience of judges in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) is different, the judge 
said. Many of them sit regularly with two trial judges and, as single judges, they consider 
applications under section 31 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 ‘by the shed load’. These 
applications are a constant reminder of the problems faced by trial judges. The UK Supreme 
Court will simply not be able to possess this kind of knowledge.  
There is another problem in the way the criminal appeal jurisdiction currently operates: 
absence of certainty. The law of provocation illustrates the point. Section 3 of the Homicide 
Act 1957 says what the law is. For 20 years we were all deciding cases in accordance with the 
House of Lords decision in Camplin (1978) and Morhall (1996). Everyone thought they 
understood the law. Then came the Privy Council decision in Luc Thiet Thuan (1997), which 
included a powerful dissenting judgment by Lord Steyn. Then suddenly R v Morgan Smith 
[2000] UKHL 49 appeared in which by 3 to 2 the House of Lords recognised that what Lord 
Steyn had said represented the law. We had a new law of provocation. Then we had a bit of 
uncertainty. Then there was an appeal from Jersey to the Privy Council in Holley [2005] 
UKPC 23; a court of nine decided, by a majority of 6 to 3,  that we should revert to the law 
prior to Morgan Smith. That presented the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) with rather a 
problem as judgments of the Privy Council are not binding. The Court of Appeal (Criminal 
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Division), sitting as a panel of five presided over by the Lord Chief Justice, gave a judgment in 
R v James [2006] EWCA Crim 14 agreeing with Holley; the House of Lords did not give 
leave to appeal. So a decision of the House of Lords was in fact overturned by a judgment of 
the Privy Council followed by the Court of Appeal. In each of these cases there were 
extremely learned speeches—but we had five years of uncertainty in which directions were 
being given to juries in relation to provocation which were far too favourable to the defendant. 
And what is worse, there were five years in which convictions for murder were being 
overturned on the inaccurate basis that the House of Lords in Morgan Smith was right, 
including cases referred to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) by the Criminal Cases 
Review Commission in the light of the changed law. It is not a question of whether the House 
of Lords was right or wrong. All the speeches were beautifully reasoned.  
The judge proposed that the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) should act rather differently 
to the way it has been acting. Generally no case should be ‘certified’ unless it has been 
considered by a panel five judges (rather than the normal panel of three). Cases could often be 
identified before they are heard as one that requires five judges, or if it is identified as such a 
case during the hearing, then the hearing could be adjourned and remitted to a panel of five. 
He proposed that the five judges would include the three judges who heard the appeal and 
also the Lord Chief Justice and the Vice President of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). 
If there were five judges there would be a fuller and more refined argument and therefore 
there would be fewer cases in which it would need to be ‘certified’ that not only that there is a 
point of law of general public importance but that the case is one that ought to be heard by 
the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court. There would be rare and occasional cases where that 
test would be satisfied, for example questions on the impact of the Human Rights Act on the 
criminal justice system. Another example would be where a Court of Appeal decision involved 
the creation or recognition of an offence. 
At present, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) is required by statute to give a single 
judgment. If panels of five were used, consideration should be given to resuscitating the 
availability of the dissenting opinion (though in practice that does not often arise). 
The judge said that the main problem with his proposal would be precedence. The House of 
Lords/UK Supreme Court should be asked to develop the rules of precedent so that a five 
judge panel of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) can overrule a three judge panel 
without using any of the current exceptions to the current general rule that the Court of 
Appeal is bound by its own previous decisions.  
An alternative proposal: remove the certificate requirement  
During the seminars, some participants—including a Law Lord and a judge of the Court of 
Appeal—argued that the certification requirement should be removed, leaving criminal 
appeals to be dealt with simply on the basis of whether permission should be granted (as is the 
case with civil appeals).  
The Court of Appeal judge said that if the Court of Appeal refuses to give a certificate, that 
decision is final. There could be a temptation for judges to ring-fence their decisions. The 
arrangement also perhaps implied that criminal law is less important than civil law. This is not 
something that he could accept as criminal law is very difficult and extremely important. 
There was, he concluded, no reason why the rules should be different in criminal and civil 
cases.   
Discussion 
A Court of Appeal judge expressed the view that the proposals for larger panels were sensible, 
though dissenting judgments would need to be permitted if the Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) regularly sat in panels of five or seven. 
A practitioner said that he was persuaded by many of the points made in the proposal for the 
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) to be the final court in more cases. However, he said, it 
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was true to say that the Law Lords lack recent experience of conducting trials in all areas of 
law, not just in criminal law. He noted the danger of over specialisation and suggested that 
there are advantages of coming to a problem from a different perspective. 
A Law Lord suggested that the proposal for panels of five judges able to overrule panels of 
three might extend from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) to the Court of Appeal 
(Civil Division). Two other judges urged caution about this—not least because of the 
manpower problems that might arise if the Court of Appeal was regularly sitting in panels of 
five or even seven. 
A Court of Appeal judge referred to the convention that the Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) hardly ever grants leave to appeal to the House of Lords/Supreme Court. He 
wondered whether the Court of Appeal could adopt a practice of giving an indication if it 
thinks that the UK Supreme Court should look at a case and alert the UK Supreme Court if 
there is an urgent or important case. Another judge agreed that informally ‘flagging up’ cases 
regarded by the Court of Appeal as important would be useful. 
A Court of Appeal judge praised the current relationship between the House of Lords and the 
Court of Appeal. He commented that there is sometimes a backlog of questions, particularly 
in relation to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, but there is good co-operation with Lord 
Bingham. He hoped that this would continue with the UK Supreme Court.  He agreed that it 
is important to get the facts clear before cases get to the House of Lords. He also agreed that 
judgments in the Court of Appeal are sometimes too long. He considered that larger panels 
might be a good idea in some circumstances. The role of the UK Supreme Court will be to 
develop the great questions of law of the day and to make such decisions clear for the lower 
courts. He therefore stressed the importance of judgments being clear. 
Case study on the determination of two points of law 
The seminar concluded with a case study presented by a Court of Appeal judge, which 
illustrates the often protracted interaction between the courts and tribunals in the 
determination of a point of law (see Box 7). There were two questions of law that were quite 
fundamental to the operation of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal—namely how Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (protecting respect for home and family life) 
fits into immigration control, and who decides it. The system took nine years and three House 
of Lords judgments, all at public expense, the judge lamented. For a period of three years in 
the middle, the courts and tribunals were applying an ‘exceptionality test’, only to be told later 
that there was no such test (although the result would probably be the same). If the purpose 
of the system is to provide guidance to the lower courts and tribunals, it needs to operate 
quicker and more efficiently than this.   
BOX 7 CASE STUDY 
(1) In what circumstances does an interference with private or family life under Art 8 ECHR 
override the requirements of immigration control? 
(2) Is the judgment that of the Home Secretary reviewable by the Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal only on Wednesbury principles; or is the tribunal entitled to substitute its own decision on 
the merits? 
February 1999 Razgar, an Iraqi national, claims asylum in the UK; he had left Iraq and arrived in 
Germany in 1997 
May 2000 Home Secretary authorises Razgar‖s return to Germany as ―safe third country‖ 
under the provisions of the Dublin Convention. Judicial review claim 
commenced, alleging breach of Arts 3 and 8 ECHR, permission was refused; 
permission to appeal was lodged but discontinued. 
2000-2001 Razgar makes further representations to the Home Secretary 
April 2001 Home Secretary certifies Razgar‖s human rights claim as ―manifestly unfounded‖; 
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Razgar commences a new judicial review claim. Permission is granted by the 
Court of Appeal on amended grounds in December 2001. 
October 2002 House of Lords gives guidance on meaning of ―manifestly unfounded‖: R 
(Yogathas) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 36 
November 2002 R (Razgar) Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWHC 2554 
(Admin): Richards J quashes Home Secretary‖s certificate 
July 2003 CA dismisses appeal: Razgar [2003] EWCA Civ 840, [2003] Imm AR 29 
June 2004 HL agrees with lower courts that the claim was not ―manifestly unfounded‖: Razgar 
[2004] UKHL 27. Lord Bingham ([17]) sets out five questions under Art 8, and 
adds: ―Decisions taken in pursuant to the lawful operation of immigration control 
will be proportionate in all save a minority of exceptional cases, identifiable only on 
a case by case basis‖ ([20]) 
March 2005 Huang and Kashmiri v Secretary of State for the Home Office [2005] EWCA Civ 
105 in the CA: Laws LJ‖s judgment, following Razgar, holds that the adjudicator 
erred in failing to consider on the merits whether the case was ―truly exceptional‖. 
Huang‖s appeal succeeds; Kashmiri is held unarguable on the facts. 
March 2007 Huang and Kashmiri v Secretary of State for the Home Office [2007] UKHL 11 in 
the HL: dismisses Secretary of State‖s appeal in Huang but allows Kashmiri appeal 
in a single ―report‖ of the Appellate Committee. Razgar questions approved; but 
there is no ―test of exceptionality‖. Lord Bingham in Razgar was expressing ―an 
expectation ... not  purporting to lay down a legal test.‖ ([20]). No other test 
suggested. HL upholds decision to remit Huang to the Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal; Home Secretary concedes, without discussion, that Kashmiri should also 
be remitted (even though found ―unarguable‖ by Laws LJ). 
October 2006  AG (Eritrea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Carnwath LJ, 
permission to appeal)—one of many cases awaiting decision pending Huang.  
Carnwath LJ refuses to approve consent order, remitting to the Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal on grounds that tribunal had wrongly applied an 
―exceptionality‖ test; but grants permission to appeal, commenting: ―Although it is 
now clear that exceptionality as such is not a distinct legal test, I doubt if there is 
much difference in practice from saying that the result of the correct approach is 
that only a very small minority of cases will succeed. The implicit assumption must 
be that there has to be something unusual about the particular case to depart from 
the ordinary principles of immigration control.‖ He directs full hearing to enable CA 
to give further guidance. 
July 2007 AG (Eritrea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  [2007] EWCA Civ 801 
(substantive appeal)—CA reinterprets Razgar guidance in the light of Huang: ―no 
set formula for determining proportionality... a structured decision about it case by 
case‖ ([37]). 
January 2008 
 
Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (Hodge J and SIJ Storey) give guidance on Art 8 
in the light of Huang and AG (Eritrea): ―structured approach... following 5-stage 
Razgar approach but without an ―exceptionality‖ test; ―insurmountable obstacles‖ 
test still relevant: VW and MO Uganda [2008] UKAIT 00021 
Further reading 
ATH Smith ‘Criminal Appeals in the House of Lords’ (1984) 47 Modern Law Review 133 
R Nobles and D Schiff ‘The Right to Appeal and Workable Systems of Justice’ (2002) 65 
Modern Law Review 676 
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5. Procedures and costs in the UK Supreme 
Court 
Key issues identified in the seminar 
 The seminars acknowledged the high cost of litigation in the UK Supreme Court and the 
restriction this created on access to justice. Various options for controlling costs were 
considered. 
 Protective costs orders, it was argued by some participants, should be applied flexibly in 
the UK Supreme Court. 
 There was general agreement that hearings before the UK Supreme Court should operate 
on the basis of a dialogue between the judiciary and the bar. Some participants felt that 
the present length of oral argument is, in some cases, excessive. 
 It was suggested that third party interventions ought to the allowed at the permission 
stage. 
 The procedures by which panels of Justices will be selected were considered.  Some 
participants called for greater transparency. There was some support for the Supreme 
Court sitting in panels of seven or nine more often than the House of Lords currently 
does. 
 There may be value in the Supreme Court identifying points of law that could be 
examined by the Law Commissions. 
Procedures in the UK Supreme Court 
A Law Lord introduced discussion by saying that he was not going to comment on the Draft 
Supreme Court Rules (published in January 2007).3 Comments on the rules had been 
requested and there had been approximately 30 replies, some of which were very long. Some 
major institutions, including the Bar Council and the Law Society, had not responded. Given 
the stage reached in the consultation process, people should be clear that there was no 
possibility of major redrafting of the rules. 
The civil justice system at appeal level had traditionally depended on oral argument and 
mutual trust and dialogue between the judiciary and the bar. He considered that this approach 
had huge strengths and should not be abandoned. This had been a factor when looking for a 
new building for the UK Supreme Court, with the judges wanting to ensure that the court was 
not like an old Victorian court with the judges sitting on high, but that it was arranged more 
like a seminar.  
He noted that the present system is not perfect and there is room for improvement. 
Established structures should not, however, be pulled down merely on a theory that 
something might be an improvement. There would be change enough in moving the Law 
Lords and all their possessions to the new building. He considered that there should not be a 
radical change. 
The Law Lord touched briefly on the topic of case management. Judges and the bar both 
know that cases can change unpredictably all the way up the appellate ladder and that often 
the key issues only become clear a week before the hearing. He was against piling case 
management on at the Supreme Court level, which would often be the third or fourth level of 
appeal. Issues should be clear and if they are not, this would not be saved by case 
management. There are some cases where case management is relevant and he gave the 
example of a patent case where the Law Lords were told that it would take weeks to have the 
                                                 
3 http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/SupremeCourt_rulesconsultation.pdf 
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science explained to them. Seminars with a professor were therefore arranged for the five 
judges in advance of the hearing. The judge considered that this had been a success but noted 
that such cases would be exceptional. 
A solicitor’s perspective 
A practitioner referred to the principles on which the Supreme Court should operate— 
namely that it should be accessible, transparent, as economical and efficient as possible, and 
fair. He referred to a bill on a recent case that had gone to the House of Lords, a relatively 
simple appeal lasting three days that it had been relatively cheap because junior counsel had 
been used.  He said that counsel’s fees had amounted to £82,000 plus VAT, judicial fees 
without including applications for extensions of time had been £4,600 and printing had been 
£7,500. The total bill was £213,000 excluding VAT. 
The practitioner noted that at the moment there cannot be intervention at the leave stage but 
he considered that there are some cases where a public interest intervener might have 
something interesting to stay. He welcomed the rule that there will be no costs for or against 
an intervener to the appeal.  
The practitioner explained that intervention can be haphazard because people do not always 
know about cases. A statement that a petition has been served or that permission has been 
granted should be posted on the Supreme Court’s website with a summary of the issues. He 
gave an example of a recent intervention that had come about by pure chance by way of 
various conversations between lawyers at social engagements. This is not the best way for the 
system to operate. The Supreme Court registry could make arrangements with key players, 
such as the Equality and Human Rights Commission, to ensure that they were aware of 
relevant cases. 
In respect of protective costs orders, he said that parties had to consider costs such as those 
for stationery etc. but there is also the risk of paying the other side’s costs. The current rule 
was that the claimant or appellant must not have a personal interest in the matter; the interest 
must be public only. However, under the Human Rights Act, a person must be a ‘victim’ to 
have standing in judicial review claims which rely on Convention rights and therefore they 
would automatically have a personal interest. He thought a similar situation would arise if the 
case had constitutional impact. He gave the example of Bradley [2008] EWCA Civ 36, where 
the issue was how the government should respond to an ombudsman report. He explained 
that the claimants had lost out because their pension schemes had failed and they had relied 
on a government promise. He considered that the rule should therefore be applied flexibly. 
A barrister’s perspective 
Another practitioner spoke to a short paper dealing with two issues: restrictions on the right of 
access to the Supreme Court; and the selection of panels. 
Restrictions on the right of access 
The draft Supreme Court Rules appear to acknowledge that they can have an impact on the 
ability of litigants to exercise rights of appeal.  For example, the current obligation on 
appellants to give security for costs by paying into the House of Lords Security Fund Account 
within 7 days of the presentation of a civil appeal the sum of  £25,000 (unless all of the 
respondents agree to waive it),  does not appear to have been replicated under the proposed 
Supreme Court Rules. 
On bundles, similarly, the proposed new flexibility about the presentation of appeal 
documents will significantly lighten the burden on less well resourced appellants when 
preparing appeal. Nevertheless, the Rules and fee levels of the Supreme Court must be 
designed to avoid hindering appeals where appropriate from pro bono appellants, NGOs and 
appellants who are subject to protective costs orders or conditional fee arrangements. 
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On third party interventions, the practitioner said that the proposed Rule 45 (which prohibits 
costs orders being awarded for or against interveners) is a welcome proposal since a Home 
Office threat of seeking costs from Liberty as an intervener resulted in their withdrawal from 
the appeal in R (on the application of Marper) v Secretary of State for Home Department 
[2004] 1 WLR 2196. 
On protective costs orders (PCOs), the practitioner said that in R (on the application of 
Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2005] EWCA Civ 192, 
the Court of Appeal held that PCOs may be awarded at any stage of the proceedings, on such 
conditions as the court thought fit, provided that:  
 the court was satisfied that the issues raised were of general public importance; that the 
public interest required that those issues should be resolved;  
 the claimant had no private interest in the outcome of the case;   
 having regard to the financial resources of the claimant and the defendant and to the 
amount of costs that were likely to be involved, it was fair and just to make the order; and  
 if the order was not made the claimant would probably discontinue the proceedings and 
would be acting reasonably in so doing. 
Nevertheless, the potential costs liability for claimants in making an application for a PCO 
(whilst reduced) may still be a decisive obstacle to bringing proceedings; and the Supreme 
Court Rules will need to acknowledge this difficulty in how such applications are to be 
addressed.   
Selection of panels 
The practitioner said that, as he understood it, the current system is that the draft programme 
for cases is prepared by the Clerks to the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council some weeks before the beginning of term and then 
submitted to the Senior Law Lord and Deputy Senior Law Lord to finalise the programme for 
the following term. The heart of the system is that there is an exercise of discretion about 
which judges sit on which cases (unlike, for example the Supreme Court of the United States 
or Canada where eight Associate Justices and the Chief Justice sit on every case). The scope of 
the discretion is wide and includes: the selection of the panels themselves; the selection of ad 
hoc judges for particular panels; and the selection of the cases and panels which are to be 
heard by seven or even nine judges. 
Under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 the discretion about the selection of panel will 
include decisions:  
 to use acting judges under section 38 at the request of the President of the Supreme Court 
which may include: (i) a person who holds office as a senior territorial judge; and (ii) a 
member of the supplementary panel;  
 to use supplementary judges under section 39 which comprises any member of the House 
of Lords who (i) meets one of the conditions below; (ii) does not hold high judicial office; 
(iii) has not attained the age of 75; and (iv) is not a person who was appointed to the office 
of Lord Chancellor on or after 12 June 2003, becomes a member of the panel.  The 
conditions are (a) that he ceased to hold high judicial office less than five years before the 
commencement of these provisions; (b) that he was a member of the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council immediately before that commencement; (c) that he ceased to be a 
member of that Committee less than five years before that commencement.   A person 
becomes a member of the supplementary panel on ceasing to hold office as a judge of the 
Supreme Court or as a senior territorial judge;   but only if, while he holds such office (i) 
his membership of the panel is approved in writing by the President of the Supreme 
Court, and (ii) the President of the Court gives the Lord Chancellor notice in writing of 
the approval.  A member of the supplementary panel may resign by notice in writing to the 
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President of the Court. Unless he resigns, a person ceases to be a member of the 
supplementary panel (a) at the end of five years after the last day on which he holds his 
qualifying office; or (b) if earlier, at the end of the day on which he attains the age of 75;  
 the use a specially qualified advisors if the Supreme Court thinks it expedient under 
section 44. 
The practitioner said that the traditional justification for the current system is claimed to be: 
that the system for selecting judges is no different from that used in other UK courts; the 
discretion in the system allows the Appellate Committee to deal with its case load with 
reasonable dispatch; and the system allows the territorial composition and expertise of the 
panel to be fine-tuned. 
The criticisms of the system are a lack of transparency and the effect on outcomes. For 
example in the Pinochet cases, if the composition of the first panel had been different, then 
the case would have taken a different course. Another illustration is the conflicting decisions 
on retrospectivity in criminal cases under the Human Rights Act 1998: R v DPP Ex parte 
Kebeline [1999] UKHL 43, R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37, and R v Kansal (No 2) [2001] 
UKHL 62. Some might argue that the outcome in the recent 3:2 judgment in YL v 
Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, about whether a care home is a public authority 
for the purposes of the Human Rights Act, might have been different, were the composition of 
the panel different.   
The same issue can arise in other courts, for example in the Court of Appeal (see Hello! v 
Douglas [2000] EWCA Civ 353 where the important decision of Brooke LJ, Sedley LJ and 
Keene LJ took place because a two judge court could not agree the previous day). However, 
the practitioner suggested, the constitutional character of the Supreme Court requires a more 
principled approach. 
If, on the other hand, the Supreme Court sat en banc (as a plenary court rather than in 
panels), that arrangement would achieve complete transparency and ensure that no questions 
could arise about how the composition of the panel affected the outcome.  Such benefits 
would be at the cost of the Supreme Court: radically altering working methods (for example 
by restricting the length of oral hearings and requiring more judicial assistants); reducing the 
number of cases that can be heard; and making the exercise of identifying the ratio of a 
decision more difficult, as experience of looking at the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Canada confirms. Such a development would be regrettable because of its adverse 
consequences for the volume of cases that could be heard in domestic and Privy Council 
appeals. 
The practitioner submitted that any consideration of the issues implicit in the selection of 
panels should be informed by applying the following principles: the issue of selection involves 
larger questions than principles of case management; the issue of selection ought to 
acknowledge a perception that the composition of the panel may influence the outcomes of 
cases; the constitutional character of the Supreme Court means that selection of panels for 
decisions should be addressed by explicit procedures rather than historical conventions; and 
the explicit procedures should be as transparent as practicable.  
Discussion on panel selection 
A Law Lord acknowledged that even the Law Lords did not know exactly how panel selection 
was handled in practice. He explained that the Law Lords tell the Registrar of the Judicial 
Office what days they are not available, and a preliminary list is put forward. He explained 
that they do identify people with particular skills and that the panel is made up of people with 
a variety of skills such as jurisdictional expertise. He commented that that was important 
when building the team. He explained that the two senior Law Lords scrutinise the list and he 
said that they probably decide who should chair which case.  He explained that sitting was not 
decided at the leave stage: one has to allow for the fact that the list falls apart as people fall ill, 
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cases overrun etc, so it cannot be guaranteed that the panel set up will sit on the case. He 
considered that selection was done on a ‘best efforts’ basis. 
Another judge said that there were no options other than: sitting en banc; choosing panels at 
random; or the present system. If judges were ‘bidding’ to hear cases, it would be more likely 
to lead to a loaded court. 
A practitioner said it was very difficult to explain to a client, when they have lost 3:2, that if 
one judge on the panel had been different, they would have won. He stressed that the client 
must not be forgotten. 
A Law Lord commented that random selection would cause a problem when a complex case 
arose and there was no expert in that field on the panel. 
A Court of Appeal judge suggested a further possibility, namely that the court could sit as 
seven or nine. He explained that those people not in the House of Lords have no idea what 
moves the court to sit as seven or nine. He considered that sitting as seven or nine would 
reduce the chances of knife-edge decisions and having to explain this to clients. He said that 
he would be interested to know why the House of Lords sits in larger numbers and asked 
whether it is possible to explore whether this could happen in more cases. 
A Law Lord responded by explaining that if there is a question of the Law Lords departing 
from a decision made by five, then the court will sit as seven. He said that the court sitting as 
nine is more difficult to explain; this was more of an ad hoc process. On the recent question of 
the legality of the Iraq war [R (on the application of Gentle) v The Prime Minister [2008] 
UKHL 20], the court sat as nine. 
A practitioner pointed out that there was one case in European Court of Human Rights where 
the court had split 10:9. He said they have a system where they can relinquish a case to the 
Grand Chamber if they think it is going to be a knife-edge decision. He suggested that a 
similar system could be used here whereby a case could be relinquished to a larger panel in 
such circumstances. 
An academic asked whether when selecting a panel a combination of expertise and 
randomness could be used whereby two or three slots are filled according to territorial and 
subject expertise and then the final slots are filled according to randomness.   
A practitioner commented that whatever the system is, it would be useful for people to know 
why a panel is chosen the way it is. A Law Lord responded by asking whether it be acceptable 
to say how the selection process is normally carried out because he considered that there 
needed to be flexibility. 
Discussion on costs 
A Court of Appeal judge referred to the costs figures given by the practitioner (see above) and 
expressed his own concern about the extreme cost of litigation. If a party has to risk £200,000 
in costs, the courts are not accessible. He commented that the level of costs is frightening and 
considered that without a radical change, accessibility would not be achieved. 
Another judge commented that the draft Supreme Court Rules, which currently say merely 
that tax officers shall make an assessment at an oral hearing, need more meat. He said that in 
the Iraqi Airways case, Lord Bingham had said that the Civil Procedure Rules would apply by 
analogy and that is what is done. He explained that the revised Practice Direction in the 
House of Lords seeks to limit costs but this does not seem to work. 
A practitioner stressed that it is important to control costs. He considered that there is some 
room for reform, such as removing the need for a statement of facts. He explained that the 
facts are usually clear from the judgment in the lower court, and if they are not clear, it will be 
because they are not agreed. A lot of time is wasted in the parties agreeing the facts. There is 
value in having a statement of issues and also in the printed case. He agreed that the primacy 
of the oral hearing must be maintained but he suggested that the length of submissions could 
be reduced. He commented that Law Lords used to be rude but now they are very polite and 
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tend to tolerate lengthy submissions! He suggested that a few days before a hearing, the 
arguments that would most assist the judges could be identified and therefore the hearing 
could be limited to those arguments. 
A Law Lord noted that under the current Practice Direction, any case that is going to last 
more than two days requires a letter to be sent to the Judicial Office in the House of Lords. 
The rule could be altered so that a letter must be sent if the case is to last more than one day. 
Would it be too much to ask everyone to justify the length of the case? Almost all Privy 
Council cases ‘go short’; that is a problem because it wastes time. The way that the system 
works is that parties bid for how long they are likely to speak for and then the judges look at 
the arithmetic. If a case is given two days, it will usually last for two days. 
Another Law Lord commented that the Judicial Office in the House of Lords knows about the 
listing but the Law Lords are not always aware of the list. The Law Lords should decide the 
time estimates for a hearing, not the parties. He suggested that the views of the parties be 
heard by either a judge rapporteur or the presumed presider, who would then determine the 
length of the hearing. Another Law Lord agreed that the Law Lords ought to decide how long 
a case should last as they have the best idea about how long it will take for them to make a 
decision on the issues.  
A practitioner said that the length of a hearing would depend on the function of the hearing. If 
submissions were not allowed on paper this would mean a longer hearing but if the judges 
were just going to explore the most relevant issues this would mean a much shorter hearing.  
A Court of Appeal judge agreed that a hearing is important for judges to explore the issues. 
Could a controlled experiment be conducted on some cases? This could take place either in 
the House of Lords or the Court of Appeal and it could be done before the Supreme Court is 
established. A judge could look at the papers, discuss them with his colleagues and then 
identify areas where argument is needed. One would then be able to see if this focused a 
hearing. 
A Law Lord said it would be a good idea to have a judge rapporteur who was responsible for 
the case from the permission stage to the hearing. He thought that it would help time 
estimates and the rapporteur might be able to say if it was likely that there would be a 
divergence of views and therefore recommend the case to be heard by seven or nine. He noted 
that in the Court of Appeal the judges do discuss a case before it is heard, albeit briefly, 
whereas in the House of Lords discussion takes place only after the case has been heard. 
Another Law Lord explained that usually questions between the leave stage and the hearing 
can be referred to the Appeal Committee (of three Law Lords) who gave leave. The judge 
expected there would be resistance to the idea of having someone to identify issues or restrict 
the parties’ issues or to restrict the court’s thinking. 
A different Law Lord commented that that if there was a rapporteur to restrict issues, the 
Lords would have to be more disciplined in their approach. 
Another Law Lord considered that it would be impossible to identify issues until the 
Committee has read all the papers.  Another Law Lord agreed: the only person who can take 
control is the presiding judge in that case. He said that the Court of Appeal do discuss cases in 
advance but the idea in the House of Lords is to keep an open mind until as late as possible, 
which perhaps is not the object in the Court of Appeal. 
A practitioner commented that if documents are prepared long before the hearing this adds to 
costs. She asked whether there were any statistics in relation to the time delay between filing 
papers and the hearing. 
Another practitioner commented that the whole discussion was about ends and means. He 
said that the ends were that it was desirable to have access to justice, fairness and 
transparency. He noted that there had been no discussion about procedural autonomy. He 
said that the Supreme Court has a unique status as a court of last resort. It is not there to 
correct wrong decisions. It must have freedom to regulate its own business.  
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A judge made the point that ‘printed cases’ provide a valuable and historic document 
collection. He noted that the draft Supreme Court Rules say that these documents can be 
destroyed at the Registrar’s discretion. He considered that bound cases are valuable and 
contain original documents that cannot be found elsewhere. He therefore asked that the 
Registrar ensure that these would be made available not only to historians but that spare 
copies would be made available to libraries.  
An academic suggested that there should be the possibility of the Supreme Court granting 
leave for an appeal but ordering that the costs of the appeal from that moment (on both sides) 
should be borne by the public purse. This would be appropriate, for example, when the 
outcome of the particular appeal may be fairly obvious but the Supreme Court wishes to take 
advantage of the opportunity to clarify the law more broadly or to set out its reasons (for the 
benefit of Parliament and others) as to why the law needs to be reformed.  
References to the Law Commissions 
During discussion there was consideration about whether the Supreme Court should have the 
power officially to refer points of law that had arisen in an appeal to one or more of the UK's 
Law Commissions.  
A participant explained that such a referral would cause practical problems. He said that the 
Law Commission would wish to retain control over their programme. Perhaps, however, there 
could be a more formalised procedure whereby the judges could formally record that they 
want the Law Commission to review something and then ask the Law Commission to include 
that issue in its current programme. 
A judge gave examples where cases have been heard by the House of Lords at the same time 
that the Law Commission has been dealing with the same issue. 
Another judge said that in a recent case in the House of Lords, two Lords had disagreed with 
the majority. In that situation it would have been useful to refer a particular issue to the Law 
Commission. Of course, any such referral should not affect the outcome of the case. 
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6. The UK Supreme Court’s communication 
methods 
One theme to emerge during the seminars was the importance of effective communication by 
the UK Supreme Court. This part of the report brings together two aspects of this theme: the 
approach of the court to writing judgments; and, more broadly, the ways in which the court 
will communicate to the general public, particularly though its website. 
Key issues identified in the seminars 
 There was discussion of practices in relation to writing judgments. Some participants in 
the seminar argued for the retention of the status quo in the UK Supreme Court: that the 
norm should be seriatim judgments in which each member of the court is able in turn to 
state in his or her own words the reasons for the decision. Others suggested that the 
creation of the UK Supreme Court presented an opportunity to introduce a more routine 
use of a single judgment of the court (along the lines of the European Court of Human 
Rights) to which Justices might, if needs be, add concurring or dissenting judgments. 
 There was broad agreement about the importance of judicial deliberations before and after 
a hearing. 
 There was general agreement about the value of webcasting hearings on the UK Supreme 
Court’s website. Some concern was, however, expressed about permitting broadcasters to 
use this material in news reports. 
 There was no dissent from the suggestion that the UK Supreme Court website should 
include information about the court’s working practices, pending applications for 
permission, and the outcome of those applications. 
 The majority of participants seemed to favour making available on the UK Supreme 
Court’s website the parties’ ‘printed cases’ (ie the documents lodged in advance of the 
hearing summarising the submissions that the party would seek to make). There was some 
concern that this may lead to the printed cases being use for publicity purposes and 
becoming overly long, rather than serving their true purpose of informing the court. 
 Press releases were seen as a helpful to journalists and it was noted that they are routinely 
used in some other courts. There was some concern as to who could be expected to write 
them accurately. 
Judgment writing: the case for maintaining the status quo  
A Law Lord introduced discussion on whether the UK Supreme Court might move from the 
practice of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords by more often using single 
judgments of the court.  People have been debating this for many years—it is like the debates 
over a permanent date for Easter or fixed British Summer Time in that it comes up every year 
and is part of our legal landscape. So, although it is now brought out in a new guise, the topic 
is an old one. Frankly, the arguments on both sides are well known. 
At present, the practice is for each of the each of the Law Lords to decide whether to write 
separately, either a concurring speech or a dissent. Sometimes, however, where all the judges 
are agreed, either one judge writes a substantial speech which all the rest concur in or, in a 
practice that has been followed more recently, a single text is prepared in the form of a report 
of the Appellate Committee and the House gives effect to that. That has been done, for 
example, in criminal cases where the argument is said to be that there is advantage in a very 
clear and uncluttered formulation to be used by judges directing juries. Last summer, R v 
Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38 was prepared in the form of a report (on the question of when is it 
appropriate to find someone guilty of manslaughter where that person has been involved in 
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the supply of a class A controlled drug, which is then freely and voluntarily self-administered 
by the person to whom it was supplied, and the administration of the drug then causes his 
death). It is less common in civil cases, though not unknown (for example Henderson v 
3052775 Nova Scotia Ltd [2006] UKHL 21). Sometimes the report names a single author; 
sometimes it will profess at least to be the work of the Committee (even though in reality 
nearly all the work has been done by one person). It may or may not be significant that both 
Kennedy and the Nova Scotia case were both cases heard on the last day of court term when 
people were going on holiday and were only too happy to hand over all the work to a 
colleague! 
The Law Lord said that he himself does not favour any change from present practice, which 
he believes serves our system well.  For the most part, the speeches do present a largely 
coherent picture. That is not to deny that there are occasions when the speeches result in the 
House sending forth a less than certain sound. Lord Justice Carnwath has commented on the 
performance of the House of Lords in a recent article in Counsel magazine.4 Of course, the 
variety of reasoning in those cases may seem unfortunate to people who have to advise on the 
point in the future or to judges who have to consider a similar problem in a subsequent case. 
But the variety of approaches in speeches represents a genuine divergence of opinion among 
the judges as to the proper way to approach the issue. Indeed, in Kay v Lambeth London 
Borough Council [2006] UKHL 10 (on the scope and application of the right to respect for 
the home protected under Article 8 ECHR) what subsequently caused a problem for the 
Court of Appeal was not so much the separate speeches but the famous paragraph 110 in the 
speech of Lord Hope to which Lord Scott, Baroness Hale and Lord Brown pledged their 
loyalty so as to provide a ratio. It was the attempt to produce a united approach when the rest 
of their speeches suggested they may be taking a different line that caused the problem! The 
cases could have been put out for a further hearing to try to resolve the differences but that 
would be hard on the parties—at least one of whom may only be interested in getting an 
answer in the particular case. In any event, law is not like mathematics where there is a single 
right answer. Or if there is a single right answer to dispose of the appeal, there may be a 
variety of ways of coming to that answer. Where there are a variety of speeches, they tend to 
reflect that reality. Of course, occasionally—say construing a contract or a minor provision in 
a statute—the judge may throw his weight behind a particular view which he does not actually 
find convincing just to obtain a majority and so settle that interpretation. There is a case 
where Lord Diplock quite expressly did that. 
On the whole, the judges should be free and encouraged to express their conclusions in their 
own way, even if that means that there are divergent approaches. 
Firstly, that is consistent with the independence of the judiciary. Judges are all independent 
and though they cooperate rather well together, that cooperation must be based on the 
ultimate recognition that they cannot be forced to ‘toe a party line’. For obvious reasons, the 
need to maintain that independence is of paramount importance. 
Secondly, in the longer run at least, our system would be impoverished not enriched if we had 
more single judgments. Would we really be better off if, for instance, we did not have the 
benefit of all the insights which Lord Hoffmann has produced over the years? Would we be 
better off without those additional comments, which judges add usually because they do not 
fully share the reasoning of the leading speech? They often contain lines of thought which 
prove helpful in subsequent cases. Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] AC 465, is perhaps the 
classic example of that. That case was opening up a huge new area of tort liability, the nature 
of which was inevitably not fully understood by the judges, so they all saw things in slightly 
different ways. The speech of Lord Devlin, the most junior judge, contains a famous passage 
professedly written after he had studied the speeches of his colleagues. It takes a distinctive 
line. The market value in shares in Lord Devlin’s speech has fluctuated wildly over the years—
plummeting following an attack from Lord Griffiths, then rising more steeply quite recently. 
                                                 
4 Lord Justice Carnwath, ‘Devil We Know or New Start?’ Counsel, June 2008, 6. 
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These fluctuations simply reflect stages in the continuing attempt to understand this area of 
the law. A single judgment, with all its inevitable compromises, would have given a spurious 
certainty to law which is genuinely uncertain.  
The Law Lord noted that we have considerable experience of single judgments in the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). But anyone who has the least familiarity with, say, the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence on the Acquired Rights Directive knows it is actually very difficult to 
understand that case law even though it comes out in single texts designed to give certainty. 
These texts almost always represent the lowest common denominator. Much the same goes 
for the European Court of Human Rights. There are of course good reasons why those courts 
adopt the form of judgments that they do, but happily they are not reasons which apply to the 
UK Supreme Court.  
Single judgments of the court tend to be drab and lack individuality. Would we really be 
better off without Lord Bingham’s historical accounts? Or Lord Hoffmann’s references to Jane 
Austin? Or Lord Hope’s accounts of what he sees in the London Underground on his 
journeys to and from the House? Without Lord Steyn’s constant delight in statutes which are 
‘always speaking’? Or without Lord Mance’s researches among the heavier works of German 
legal scholarship? We would be impoverished without them. And yet we could not really have 
any of these things as embellishments on a judgment that genuinely purported to be the 
judgment of the court, the majority of whom who could perhaps not even read the German 
text. 
Judges who come to the House of Lords usually come because they find judicial work, 
including writing judgments, congenial. The silencing of them, or forcing them to make 
compromises in a judgment written by a colleague is only likely to lead to considerable 
frustration and unhappiness without improving the quality of output of the court. Genuine 
enthusiasm for the job—which is shown the care taken to prepare speeches—would not long 
survive an attempt to force them into uniformity. The judges in the House of Lords are a 
small group. Forcing judges to agree a single text would only lead to real unease within the 
group.  Any determined attempt to do so would be a recipe for disharmony, which would be 
quite the worst start for the Supreme Court. Real unity of approach comes from a court in 
which the judges work in harmony and whereby reasoning things through for themselves they 
come to see that one particular approach should be followed.  
Writing a speech is the only way to get to the bottom of a subject. Any expectation of a move 
towards the use of single judgments would actually lead to less attention to detail. That would 
be bad for the system in the long run.  
Finally, any change to a single judgment would tend to increase the power and influence of 
the senior members of the court at the expense of the more junior members. Of course, in 
good times, with someone like Lord Bingham in charge, that may not matter very much. The 
judge said that he was a great admirer of Lord Diplock in many ways, but he was sure that the 
kind of dominance that he exercised over his colleagues was pretty unhealthy.5 Having a single 
judgment would give a future Lord Diplock even more power and tend to block up the outlet 
for productive thought among his colleagues. 
For all these reasons, the Law Lord said that he believed very firmly that the balance of 
advantage lies in leaving it to the judges to decide what they should say and how they should 
say it. If they cannot be trusted to exercise that freedom sensibly and responsibly then they 
should not have been appointed in the first place. 
                                                 
5 Editor’s note: Stephen Sedley and Godfrey Le Quesne, in their entry on Lord Diplock in the Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography write ‘But it was not only advocates who feared Diplock. The disdain 
he found increasingly difficult to conceal for judicial views contrary to his own sometimes stifled 
discussion and dissent. It was to this, as much as to policy, that the tendency of the house when he was 
in the chair to limit decisions to a single speech may have been due; but that the single speech was as 
often as not Diplock's was more of a tribute to his phenomenal industry than to his personal 
dominance’. 
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Judgement writing: the case for change 
A judge of the Court of Appeal said that there are basically three forms of judgment in 
appellate or ‘apex’ courts. 
(1)  The single (sole) judgment, as seen in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), mostly in 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the European Court of Justice and some civilian 
courts.  
(2) Seriatim judgments, which we see in England and Wales, where judges on a panel give 
individual judgments in succession. The reasons for adopting this model is said to be (a) 
judicial independence; (b) accountability of judges; (c) the avoidance of any risk of adjustment 
of reasoning.   
(3) Single majority and separate dissenting/concurring judgments, seen in the US Supreme 
Court. The reasons for adopting single majority judgments include that it should make the 
law more certain, coherent and accessible. But where there is a single judgment, the judges 
have to modify their reasoning in order to get the largest majority to sign up to the judgment. 
That means judgments are not fully stated and can reduce the development of the law. That 
may be why the judgments of the US Supreme Court have been described as a ‘great literary 
wasteland’. 
All these models are familiar, but none should be taken to be ‘pure forms’. All have variants.  
There is a spectrum of models of judgment writing and a wide variety of choices. 
The US Supreme Court developed the practice of single judgments during the time of Chief 
Justice Marshall. He encouraged the court to deliver a single opinion. In the last 20 years or 
so, the judgments of the US Supreme Court have become more fragmented but it is still not 
that court’s style to have seriatim judgments. 
No one would disagree with the proposition that we should have dissenting judgments. They 
plant the seeds for future development of the law. Obiter dicta are also very valuable. Lord 
Devlin once wrote that they are the ‘rumblings from Olympus, which signal bad weather in 
the future’.  
Factors influencing the model of judgment include the personalities of judges. In the US 
Supreme Court, Justice Scalia is extremely outspoken and very critical of his colleagues; 
Justice Sandra Day O’Conner, by contrast, had a practice of trying to bring different judges 
together. She preferred to work behind the scenes. You cannot have all Scalias; you cannot 
have all Day O’Connors—but the fact is the make-up of the court is going to have an 
influence on the form of judgments. 
Resources are also an influence. Some courts have more funds for law clerks to help the 
judges than other courts do. In some jurisdictions, judges have been reduced in status to the 
editors of judgments, rather than writers. 
Institutional arrangements to facilitate internal engagement also affect the form of judgments. 
These may be formal meetings but they also include informal arrangements—conversations in 
rooms, over the phone. If these are in place, it is more likely that common agreement can be 
more easily achieved.   
The judge assumed that everyone wants to get the best out of all possible models. There are 
ways in which the seriatim judgment practices might be improved. In a previous seminar, a 
Law Lord had stressed the importance of accessibility of judgments in the new Supreme 
Court as a guiding factor in the need for improvements.  Reforms directed at improving 
accessibility might include (a) the use of ‘roadmaps’ in judgments, (b) issuing press 
summaries, (c) fuller headnotes, and (d) shortening judgments. 
We need to have a radical look at the forms of judgment. The public are bound to ask why is 
it necessary to have separate judgments from each member of the court when it is unanimous 
when there is a fair chance of repetition—for instance, judges citing the same passages from 
the authorities. That does sometimes happen in the Court of Appeal, but only rarely. After the 
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hearing a decision is taken as to who is going to prepare the judgment and in practice people 
do not tend to write their own judgment. How would we respond to this criticism?  
The judge did not dissent from the importance of individual contributions. But we have had 
the present system of writing seriatim judgments for centuries. The institution of the Supreme 
Court is a wonderful opportunity, which will never come again, to think again about our 
practices.  
Leading supreme courts across the world have considered the use of seriatim judgments and 
have decided to adopt some other model as their main model. The Canadian Supreme Court, 
in response to criticism from the profession about prolix judgments, decided some years ago 
that it would strive for a single judgment wherever possible and for a single dissenting 
judgment if there were opposing views. That change was very well received.  
The judge said that it is not necessarily appropriate for the UK Supreme Court to have a 
single majority judgment. Looking at various jurisdictions, it can be seen that the form of the 
judgment is always going to be a matter for the ethos of the particular court. But there is no 
reason to have just one form of judgment. We should look at the possibility of change as part 
of the process of bringing about the UK Supreme Court.  
The judge suggested that there should be more regular consideration of the various options 
for forms of judgment. If you could have a single substantive judgment, that could be an 
improvement—but the old adage applies that it takes longer to draft short (ie a single 
judgment) than it does to write long. Priorities have to be identified and balanced. The value 
of having every single Justice express the reasoning in his or her own words is not necessarily 
as great as having a coherent and certain statement of the law covering all the points that the 
Justices individually would have wished to raise. Concurring or dissenting judgments should 
only be given if you have something different to say. If you are going to write a concurring 
judgment, or a dissenting judgment, it is necessary to make it clear what it is you agree with 
and what it is you do not agree with. It is preferable if you do not repeat the facts and do not 
repeat citations of authority.  The Law Lord had said that students had ‘hours of fun’ looking 
at Hedley Byrne v Heller; but practitioners today do not have hours to spend reading our 
judgments. But where there is something new to add, something different to say there should 
certainly be separate judgments.  When it comes to writing separate judgments, it is not quite 
enough to say ‘these are my reasons, which are substantially the same as those in the main 
judgment’. It is much better to be quite clear about it.  
Finally, the judge stressed the value of ‘internal engagement’. It does not have to be lengthy, it 
does not have to be formal. Pre-hearing conferences are important. Post-hearing engagement 
is too. If the case is breaking new ground—and most cases in the UK Supreme Court will be 
dong that—you are not simply deciding the case, saying ‘the answer is X for the following four 
reasons’. You are also thinking hard about the development of the law and the direction you 
want to point it in for the future. That sort of thing is much better done when there has been 
internal engagement and people have thought and spoken about those deeper issues. 
Coherence of the law is very important, making sure it hangs together. To have coherence, 
you need to have collaboration among the people who are writing the judgments. It is internal 
engagement which will ensure that the UK Supreme Court will have judgments that are 
lasting and of the highest quality. How you achieve internal engagement, or any change, 
requires consensus about the aims of judgment writing and the role of the Supreme Court 
generally and in the individual case which is being decided. 
Discussion 
A Law Lord referred to judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The process 
resulted in a single, authoritative text that lacks the monolithic features of the European Court 
of Justice’s judgments (which frequently bear the signs of the lowest common denominator 
since it speaks with a single voice and carries no assents or dissents). The beauty of the 
Strasbourg model—which is very much the US Supreme Court’s model as well—is that to 
that single judgment, which is the voice of the court, and which sets out a rationale to which 
 
34 QMUL Supreme Court Seminars 
the majority assent, can be added both assenting and dissenting judgments. The individual 
voices are heard and, indeed, some of the better prose is found in those judgments. That is a 
useful model and the real alternative to seriatim judgments. So far as concerns certainty, the 
judge was troubled by the reference earlier in the seminar to giving ‘spurious certainty’ to law 
that is in reality uncertain. The one thing that judges are not allowed to do is announce that 
the law is uncertain. As collegiate courts of three, five, seven or nine, we have to come to a 
conclusion for better or for worse as to what the law is. We have to do the best we can to 
produce certainty. 
The Law Lord said that he believed that the European Court of Justice style of judgment was 
based on a process that is not transparent and leads to some very unsatisfactory judgments. 
There was however something to be said for an overall review of the kind that does not usually 
take place once judgments have been written. There is no system of a rapporteur or anyone 
standing back and asking ‘where are we getting to?’. There are exceptions to this and he had 
found those valuable. The judge said that at present the Law Lords have quite inadequate 
facilities for meetings so it is not as easy as it will be in the new building. Under the present 
system there is a slight risk that people, having written exhaustively a judgment, part with it 
and say ‘that’s it’. There is some scope for more discussion to see whether there is possibly 
some overlap which could be excised or, more importantly, alternatively whether there might 
be some points which could be further explored with a view to trying to achieve a greater or 
more satisfactory consensus. Having said that, paragraph 110 of Kay v Lambeth London 
Borough Council [2006] UKHL 10, which notoriously caused problems, was an attempt at 
that. 
Another Law Lord agreed that it is desirable that there should be more rather than less 
discussion between members of the court. He was all for people writing their own judgments 
but it is important that at the end of the case that it should be as clear as possible what the 
court has actually decided. The person writing the press notice at the end of the case would be 
the most important person! Surely it all depends on the class of case which is the best 
approach. You cannot have a one size fits all. For example, in criminal cases the single most 
important point is that trial judges should know what they are to tell the jury. The same is true 
of some kinds of civil case. He questioned the value of long concurring judgments. He 
deprecated any ‘Diplockian rule’ that there should only be one judgment but it is surely 
desirable in many classes of case to have one judgment or at any rate one leading speech. 
Those who wish to add their bon mots should certainly do so, but concurring judgments 
should focus on points of difference and should be rather shorter.  
A different Law Lord commented on the question of certainty: of course you have to be 
certain as to why a particular appeal is disposed of as it is but there may be differing reasons as 
to why you take that view and very different views as to which way the law should go from that 
point on. With the best will in the world, we are not required to be certain and to specify a 
‘party line’ on that. We really must remain at liberty to indicate our thinking. We used to say 
in the Court of Appeal, if it is a difficult case (and nowadays most cases coming before the 
Law Lords are) you ‘see how it writes’. Until you start writing it, you really do not know what 
your thinking is. By all means, let us meet more often afterwards if there is time—and we can 
hear fewer appeals—and try to achieve a greater consensus.  The judge said he did not know 
how a civil servant would be able to write press releases. Dissents are clearly valuable on 
occasion.  Lord Ackner’s explanation of when you dissent is a good one: when your sense of 
outrage at your colleague’s stupidity exceeds your natural indolence!   
Another judge raised another aspect of judgment writing that had not been touched on, 
namely style. Length is important. The Australian High Court’s experience is that the length 
of judgments has been directly related to the number of law clerks the Justices have (they now 
have three and the judgments have become longer). Another issue is the material used. For a 
number of years, the Canadian Supreme Court in their official reports includes, as well as 
‘cases’ and ‘legislation’, ‘literature’ cited. That is of some value. There is a more general issue 
that comes up. The courts are now receiving more amicus briefs and it may be that there will 
be more policy-type arguments. Some thought has to be given to that over the coming years.  
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A further aspect is courtesy. In the US Supreme Court, footnotes in judgments are often used 
to comment on other judgments and sometimes those comments are acerbic. In the UK 
Supreme Court there should be a continuation of the courtesy which the Law Lords exhibit to 
each other and to more junior judges. 
A practitioner said there is a case at the moment wending its way to Strasbourg in which a 
dissatisfied litigant from the House of Lords is arguing that English law on a particular topic is 
not clear, predictable and accessible—and is seeking to demonstrate that by pointing out the 
differences between the Law Lords’ speeches (who all reach the same conclusion but for some 
fairly significantly different reasons). It is a case where allegedly he has been deprived of his 
property otherwise than ‘in accordance with the law’ because the law of England on 
matrimonial finance proceedings is not clear, predictable and accessible. That said, the 
practitioner was very much in favour of continuing to have separate judgments and concerned 
about the suggestions that the majority reasoning should be contained in a single judgment, 
which may have less well presented prose than the dissenting judgments. 
Another practitioner said that from his perspective as a practitioner he had never found any 
greater difficulty in dealing with an array of judgments than single judgments. To take an 
example: in Douglas v Hello! Magazine there is a single judgment of the Court of Appeal 
which was neither more nor less easy to grapple with than the array of judgments in the House 
of Lords. As a practitioner and also perhaps as a member of the public one gets a certain sense 
of security in seeing that all the judgments are out there in the top court and they can compete 
against each other, not just in the disposition of the particular appeal but also over time. 
Through a Darwinian process, a particular judgment may come out on top. 
A participant, who has experience of the Law Commission, agreed with those who were 
supporting the continued use of separate ‘dissenting’ judgments—ie not necessarily dissenting 
in the result, but dissenting in the analysis. In many cases, it is the difference in the analysis 
that provides food for future development and is the driving-engine for change in the future. 
A practitioner said he hoped that the judges would not go away thinking that all members of 
the bar were quite as conservative on the question of separate speeches! Three points occurred 
to him. First, the importance of deliberation in improving the quality of judgments. If two 
barristers were jointly instructed to advise, if barrister A had done the first draft, there is no 
doubt at all that before putting his name to it, barrister B would have suggested inadequacies 
in A’s reasoning, improvements in the way things are expressed, possibly causing A to think 
carefully about things he had asserted confidently—he wondered whether it is so very different 
for judges.  Secondly, in his experience, law students often struggle to understand the 
complexity of what is being said in five separate judgments. These judgments are not for 
barristers but for Citizens Advice Bureau workers, for students trying to work out what the 
law is. The more one can do by way of a judgment of a court to indicate what the law is, the 
better. Third, the UK Supreme Court will be giving judgments on matters of concern to 
people in other jurisdictions. The practitioner had been asked by a foreign lawyer what the 
House of Lords had decided in a particular case. The practitioner had the embarrassing task 
of explaining that there were five separate speeches, only one of them had even referred to 
speeches other than his own—and that was to say that he thought his opinion was broadly in 
agreement with theirs. The overseas lawyer gave up in the end and decided, as is often the 
case, that the UK was a bit of a mystery.  
A judge of the Court of Appeal, tying together the various threads of argument, referred to a 
case in which he sat in the Court of Appeal and gave joint judgments in two cases (both of 
which were overturned). He wrote the easy part—what is sometimes called the ‘scaffolding’. 
Judge X wrote the guts of one of them and Judge Y the guts of the other. It was a judgment of 
the court. To anyone who knew anything about the three judges, it was absolutely clear who 
had written which bit.... That perhaps does illustrate some of the problems in writing a single 
judgment where different people have written different parts.  
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A practitioner’s perspective on the engagement of the UK Supreme Court with the 
public 
A practitioner introduced the topic of the engagement of the Supreme Court with the public. 
He started form the premise that the Supreme Court will perform its important constitutional 
functions most effectively if it communicates effectively with the public.  He had a number of 
practical suggestions for measures that the Supreme Court could adopt to promote 
engagement with those members of the public who are listening.  
First of all, the working methods of the court need to be clearly explained on the court’s 
website, for example how panels are chosen. The procedures adopted need to be explained 
very carefully so that people understand what is going on. 
Secondly, the court’s website should identify very clearly when applications for permission 
have been made and when an appeal has been granted—so that everyone knows what cases 
are pending and what cases are under consideration.  
Third, in the weeks before an appeal commences, the court’s website should enable all 
interested persons to obtain access to the statement of facts and issues (assuming that such a 
document remains in the Supreme Court) and also the ‘printed cases’ (see Box 8) for the 
parties. There is absolutely no reason why those documents should not be widely available to 
anyone who wishes to understand what points are going to be decided. Of course, there may 
be exceptional cases where there is something confidential that needs to be concealed, but he 
could not remember a case in recent years where there has been something in the ‘printed 
cases’ that is so confidential. In the days preceding the appeal, the Supreme Court ought to 
follow the practice that has been adopted for many years in the European Court of Justice and 
the European Court of Human Rights of having a press release that summarises in broad 
terms what the issues in the case are. That would not be in any way binding on anyone, but it 
would serve a very valuable purpose in informing people about what is going on.  
Fourthly—and this may be controversial, though the practitioner did not understand why—
there is no longer any justification, if ever there was, for refusing to allow people outside the 
courtroom to watch an appeal on matters of public interest and importance. All cases in the 
UK Supreme Court are going to be of public interest and importance. The European Court 
of Human Rights provides on the internet a webcam broadcast of hearings, which is available 
on the day of the hearing. You can watch the whole of the proceedings from London or 
wherever.  The presence of the cameras, which have fixed positions, provides no distraction 
whatsoever for those participating in the hearing.  This enables students, law lecturers, judges, 
members of the public who cannot attend the proceedings to learn about the issues which are 
the subject of the argument. Perhaps more controversial would be whether broadcast 
organisations should be allowed to use this material in news programmes. The prohibition in s 
41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 on a person taking photographs in a courtroom does not 
apply to the UK Supreme Court (Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s 45). 
A final suggestion is that when judgments are given, the UK Supreme Court should follow the 
practice now adopted in the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human 
Rights and issue a press release summarising the judgment. Again, this is not binding in any 
way. This is especially important if we retain the practice of divergent and complementary 
judgments rather than a judgment of the court. This is particularly important in complex 
cases in which journalists have deadlines to meet that the court assists them to understand 
what has been decided and in broad terms why. It does no service whatsoever that journalists 
who read the material, most of whom are not expert lawyers, have to struggle to understand 
what has been decided and by whom and then communicate that in a way that may not be 
accurate. 
These practices would bring the working practices of the UK Supreme Court into line with 
the practices that are followed, without controversy, by other supreme courts throughout the 
common law world. Those other courts have followed these practices because they have 
recognised that no supreme court is an island entire of itself. Whatever it does, the UK 
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Supreme Court will, sadly, be misreported and misrepresented on occasions.  To improve 
understanding of the function of the Supreme Court and to promote understanding of its 
decisions, it would be well advised to take all reasonable and practical steps to enhance and 
promote communication with the outside world.  
BOX 8: DOCUMENTS CURRENTLY REQUIRED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
11. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ISSUES 
11.1   It is the appellants' responsibility to lodge a Statement of the facts and issues (with an Appendix 
(see direction 12)). The Statement should be a succinct account of the main facts of the case, 
including an account of judicial proceedings up to that point and an account of the issues raised by 
the appeal. The appellants are responsible for drawing up the Statement in draft and they must 
submit it to the respondents for discussion and agreement. The Statement must be a single document 
agreed between the parties. In the event of disagreement, disputed material should be removed from 
the draft Statement and included instead in each party's case (see direction 15). The Statement must 
be signed on behalf of each party by at least one counsel who appeared in the court below or who will 
appear at the hearing before the House.  
15. APPELLANTS' AND RESPONDENTS' CASES 
15.1 The case is the statement of a party's argument in the appeal. 
15.2 The case should be confined to the heads of argument that counsel propose to submit at the 
hearing and omit material contained in the Statement of facts and issues. The members of the Appeal 
Committee who gave leave to appeal may not be sitting on the Appellate Committee; and so it cannot 
be assumed that the members of the Appellate Committee will be familiar with the arguments set out 
in the petition for leave to appeal. 
Discussion 
A Law Lord responded by assuring the practitioner that almost everything that he had 
suggested has been considered by the committee of Law Lords planning for the Supreme 
Court. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has had experience of a webcam in the 
Pitcairn Islands case. A request was made for the entire proceedings to be recorded and made 
available on Pitcairn. As far as the Law Lords in that case were concerned, the recording was 
totally unobtrusive and he could not see any objection to that being done.  
On printed cases, the judge’s concern was that they are drafted by advocates for a particular 
audience; the whole point of a printed case should be to introduce oral argument to those who 
are going to have to listen to it. The judge  wondered whether there is a risk in the future of 
counsel ‘grandstanding’  by using printed cases as an opportunity for propaganda, which 
would diffuse the utility of printed cases. Printed cases sometimes tend to be too long, and 
may become longer if counsel knew they were going to be made available to the public.  
On broadcasters: one point that can be taken for granted is that we are not dealing with the 
problems that arise if one were attempting to televise a criminal trial. The problem really is the 
extent to which broadcasters would engage with getting the message across in a responsible 
way. In small doses it may have a value. 
A judge of the Court of Appeal said that the televising of the giving of judgment in the first 
Pinochet case was widely seen around the world and watched live by huge crowds in public 
squares in Chilean cities as a kind of ‘penalty shoot-out’. It did the UK’s standing the world of 
good in legal circles elsewhere in the world.  
Another judge took up the point about the public availability of printed cases. He noted that 
not everyone in the seminar agreed with that proposition but he thought it was extremely 
important. The Civil Procedure Rules have recently been amended so that particulars of claim 
and defences are publicly available unless the court makes a special order.  Even more 
recently, in the Administrative Court ruled that acknowledgements of service in judicial 
review proceedings are the equivalent of defences and they should be publicly accessible. It 
would be rather unfortunate if the UK Supreme Court takes a more restrictive approach 
towards printed cases, which are in some ways analogous to particulars of claim and defences. 
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It is also extremely important for anyone who wishes to take a serious interest in the 
arguments to see the printed cases; after all, they will be taken as read by the Justice of the 
Supreme Court.  
Another participant said that the Law Commission and academics, who deal with the law to 
see its future as a working tool, obviously find it extremely helpful to see printed cases the 
moment they are available. They can be obtained from counsel when we know about them, 
but accessibility would be so much better through a website.  
A judge said that judges operate as public servants. There has to be more transparency and 
accessibility today than in the past. 
Further reading 
D Oliver, ‘Singularly supreme?’ Counsel, April 2008, 8 
Lord Justice Carnwath, ‘Devil We Know or New Start?’ Counsel, June 2008, 6 
Lady Justice Arden, ‘The Form of Judgments in Common Law Jurisdictions: A Comparison - 
Conference in Honour of Lord Bingham’ (online at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/speeches/amatter_of_style_bingham_conference.pdf)  
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7. The UK Supreme Court and Scotland 
Key issues from the seminars 
In several of the seminars, questions relating to Scottish appeals were considered. The points 
made are brought together in this part of the report. 
 There is no permission/leave requirement for Scottish civil appeals to the UK Supreme 
Court. Among the seminar participants, including those with experience of legal 
practice in Scotland, there was recognition that this was an anomalous arrangement 
that could no longer be easily justified. Views differed on the scale and urgency of the 
problem. Legislation by the Scottish Parliament (or the UK Parliament with the 
consent of the Scottish Parliament) would be needed if reform is to be made. 
 The UK Supreme Court has no general jurisdiction over Scottish criminal appeals. 
There was a shared understanding that any suggestion that the UK Supreme Court 
should have a role in relation to Scottish criminal law raises constitutional and 
practical questions. Nonetheless some participants in the seminars attached 
importance to the uniform interpretation of UK statutes and saw a role for the UK 
Supreme Court in this, even in criminal cases from Scotland. 
 The use of section 57 of the Scotland Act 1998 has created an appeal route for 
‘devolution issues’ in criminal justice matters to the Privy Council—and in future to 
the UK Supreme Court—where it is alleged that there has been a breach of Article 6 
ECHR. The seminar heard that the use of this appeal route in the way it has 
developed was not intended in 1998 and that it has led to practical problems in 
criminal trials and appeals. The Commission on Scottish Devolution chaired by Sir 
Kenneth Calman is currently looking into this. Primary legislation by the UK 
Parliament, amending the Scotland Act, would be required to implement reforms.  
 The possibility of legislation by the Scottish Parliament to end all civil appeals to the 
UK Supreme Court was noted. While such a development is not imminent (the 
seminar was told) it appears to be closer than at any time in the recent past. It could 
be brought about the legislation in the Scottish Parliament. Clearly such a step would 
have significant constitutional implications for the whole of the UK.  
Background: appeals from the courts of Scotland to the Supreme Court 
Section 40(3) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (see Box 2 above) preserves the 
arrangements for appeals from the Scottish court system to the House of Lords for the UK 
Supreme Court, but does nothing to explain what they are.  The constitutional starting point 
for any explanation of the position is Article XIX of the Union with Scotland Act 1706 (see 
Box 9). 
No criminal appeals from the High Court of Justiciary 
In criminal cases, there is no right of appeal from the High Court of Justiciary to the UK 
Supreme Court. In Mackintosh v Her Majesty’s Advocate (1876), the House of Lords held 
that it was incompetent to appeal from the High Court of Justiciary to the House of Lords.  
Section 124(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 now provides that, subject to 
provisions in the Scotland Act 1998 on ‘devolution issues’, ‘every interlocutor and sentence 
pronounced by the High Court under this Part of this Act shall be final and conclusive and 
not subject to review by any court whatsoever’. The High Court of Justiciary is therefore 
Scotland’s supreme criminal court—subject to the rather complex and still uncertain 
arrangements under which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has jurisdiction over 
‘devolution issue’ appeals relating to alleged breaches of Convention rights in some aspects of 
the criminal justice system (see below). 
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Box 9 UNION WITH SCOTLAND ACT 1706, Article XIX 
That the Court of Session or Colledge of Justice do after the Union and notwithstanding thereof 
remain in all time coming within Scotland as it is now constituted by the Laws of that Kingdom and 
with the same Authority and Priviledges as before the Union subject nevertheless to such Regulations 
for the better Administration of Justice as shall be made by the Parliament of Great Britain And that 
hereafter none shall be named by Her Majesty or Her Royal Successors to the Ordinary Lords of 
Session but such who have served in the Colledge of Justice as Advocats or Principal Clerks of 
Session for the space of five years or as Writers to the Signet for the space of ten years With this 
provision That no Writer to the Signet be capable to be admitted a Lord of the Session unless he 
undergo a private and publick Tryal on the Civil Law before the Faculty of Advocats and be found by 
them qualified for the said Office two years before he be named to be a Lord of the Session, yet so as 
the Qualifications made or to be made for capacitating persons to be named Ordinary Lords of 
Session may be altered by the Parliament of Great Britain. And that the Court of Justiciary do also 
after the Union and notwithstanding thereof remain in all time coming within Scotland as it is now 
constituted by the Laws of that Kindom and with the same Authority and Priviledges as before the 
Union subject nevertheless to such Regulations as shall be made by the Parliament of Great 
Britain and without prejudice of other Rights of Justiciary. 
Civil appeals from the Court of Session 
Civil appeals to the UK Supreme Court from the Inner House of the Court of Session to the 
UK Supreme Court are governed generally by section 40(3) of the Constitutional Reform Act 
2005 (see Box 2) by the Court of Session Act 1988 (Box 10). Appeals are restricted to points 
of law; findings of fact and the exercise of judicial discretion cannot therefore be appealed. 
Legislation also precludes appeals beyond the Inner House in relation to a number of specific 
decisions. 
Where the appeal is on an interlocutory matter (ie against a ruling made by the court between 
the commencement of legal proceedings and their final determination), leave is needed from 
the Court of Session unless there is a dissent among the panel of judges which heard the case.  
Some Acts of Parliament also impose a leave requirement (eg Aircraft and Shipbuilding Act 
1977 section 9; Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992 section 11) 
In relation to final judgments of the Inner House of the Court of Session, there is no general 
requirement for appeals to be granted leave/permission, either from the Inner House or the 
UK Supreme Court. Instead, there is a rule that the petition of appeal must be signed by two 
counsel who must certify that the appeal is reasonable.  
Box 10 COURT OF SESSION ACT 1988  
Section 40 Appealable interlocutors 
(1) Subject to the provisions of any other Act restricting or excluding an appeal to the Supreme Court 
and of sections 27(5) and 32(5) of this Act, it shall be competent to appeal from the Inner House to 
the Supreme Court– 
(a) without the leave of the Inner House, against a judgment on the whole merits of the cause, or 
against an interlocutory judgment where there is a difference of opinion among the judges or where 
the interlocutory judgment is one sustaining a dilatory defence and dismissing the action; 
(b) with the leave of the Inner House, against any interlocutory judgment other than one falling within 
paragraph (a) above. 
(2) An interlocutor of the Inner House granting or refusing a new trial, on an application under section 
29 of this Act, shall be appealable without the leave of the Inner House to the Supreme Court; and on 
such an appeal the Supreme Court shall have the same powers as the Inner House had on the 
application and in particular the powers specified in sections 29(3) and 30(3) of this Act. 
(3)It shall be incompetent to appeal to the Supreme Court against an interlocutor of a Lord Ordinary 
unless the interlocutor has been reviewed by the Inner House. 
(4)On an appeal under this section all the prior interlocutors in the cause shall be submitted to the 
review of the Supreme Court. 
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Devolution issue appeals 
When the United Kingdom’s systems of devolution was created in 1998, it was clear that 
there needed to be a judicial body to determine any legal disputes about the limits of the 
powers of the Scottish Parliament, Scottish Government, Northern Ireland Assembly, 
Northern Ireland Executive, National Assembly for Wales and the Welsh Assembly 
Government. The devolved institutions are expressly prohibited by the devolution Acts from 
legislating or acting contrary to Convention rights—defined in the same way as in the Human 
Rights Act 1998—and European Union law (see Box 11). This role was given to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (‘the Privy Council’) rather than the Appellate Committee of 
the House of Lords. In practice, the same judges—the Law Lords—sit in both courts, though 
the legislative framework governing the composition of the Privy Council allows for some 
flexibility—for example, senior judges from England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern 
Ireland who are not Law Lords are also eligible to sit. Jurisdiction over ‘devolution issues’ is 
transferred to the UK Supreme Court by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. If current 
trends continue, devolution issues will be a relatively small proportion of the caseload of the 
UK Supreme Court.  
BOX 11 SCOTLAND ACT 1998 
Section 57 Community Law and Contention Rights 
(2) A member of the Scottish Executive has no power to make any subordinate legislation, or to do 
any other act, so far as the legislation or act is incompatible with any of the Convention rights or with 
Community law. 
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to an act of the Lord Advocate— 
(a) in prosecuting any offence, or 
(b) in his capacity as head of the systems of criminal prosecution and investigation of deaths in 
Scotland, which, because of subsection (2) of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, is not unlawful 
under subsection (1) of that section. 
Schedule 6 Devolution Issues 
In this Schedule ―devolution issue‖ means— 
(a) a question whether an Act of the Scottish Parliament or any provision of an Act of the Scottish 
Parliament is within the legislative competence of the Parliament, 
(b) a question whether any function (being a function which any person has purported, or is 
proposing, to exercise) is a function of the Scottish Ministers, the First Minister or the Lord Advocate, 
(c) a question whether the purported or proposed exercise of a function by a member of the Scottish 
Executive is, or would be, within devolved competence, 
(d) a question whether a purported or proposed exercise of a function by a member of the Scottish 
Executive is, or would be, incompatible with any of the Convention rights or with Community law, 
(e) a question whether a failure to act by a member of the Scottish Executive is incompatible with any 
of the Convention rights or with Community law, 
(f) any other question about whether a function is exercisable within devolved competence or in or as 
regards Scotland and any other question arising by virtue of this Act about reserved matters. 
In his report commissioned by the Scottish Executive, Improving Practice: the 2002 Review of 
the Practices and Procedure of the High Court of Justiciary, Lord Bonomy recommended that 
‘Schedule 6 of the Scotland Act should be amended to make it clear that acts or failures to act 
by the Lord Advocate as prosecutor, and anyone acting on his authority or on his behalf as 
prosecutor, are excluded from the definition of a devolution issue. The Scottish Executive 
should urge the United Kingdom Parliament to make that amendment’ (para 17.14).6  The 
‘mechanisms for dealing with ‘devolution issues’’ is one of the matters under review by the 
                                                 
6 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2002/12/15847/14122. 
 
42 QMUL Supreme Court Seminars 
Commission on Scottish Devolution, chaired by Sir Kenneth Calman.7  The Calman 
Commission intends to make a final report during 2009. 
A view of the Scottish legal system  
This section summarises a presentation given by a member of the judiciary. He emphasised 
how few Scottish cases are currently dealt with by the House of Lords. During the 1980s and 
1990s there were, on average, 5.6 appeals each year from Scotland but in the period since 
2000 it has dropped to below 5 (which he regarded as a fairly stable situation). The most 
likely explanation for the reduction in numbers of appeals is the cost to the litigant. The 
average number of devolution appeals (currently dealt with by the Privy Council) was 2.5 a 
year but in the five most recent years of published statistics this has dropped to 1.5 a year. 
This is explained by an initial enthusiasm from the Scottish criminal bar, with support from 
the emerging human rights bar, in the early years after the Scotland Act 1998.  There were on 
average just under 5 petitions for ‘special leave’ to the Privy Council, down to less than three 
in recent years. 
Influence of the House of Lords 
The qualitative effect of this (the judge suggested) is that for many Scottish appeals, the 
House of Lords does not act as a top level, creative supervisory court. In practice, it deals with 
Scottish cases which turn on their own special facts, or particular contract clauses, which are 
of no huge national significance. There are examples of some very low value cases. In some 
appeals, the appellants’ cases have been regarded as hopeless by the House of Lords. These 
cases had not been of public importance and had not necessarily been an appropriate matter 
for the House of Lords.  
Problems arise because in all but a few cases the litigant in Scotland has a right of appeal 
without leave. The creation of the UK Supreme Court assumes that there will be no change. 
If this is so, Scottish cases will continue to include appeals of the sort just described. 
Donoghue v Stevenson (1932)—the landmark cases from which the modern law of negligence 
stems—was the Scottish legal system’s 15 minutes of fame; what has happened since then has 
been anticlimactic. Apart from a period in the 1960s, when the House of Lords provided 
necessary correctives to the Inner House of the Court of Session, it has not decided cases of 
great importance from Scotland.  
Absence of a leave requirement 
Should there be a requirement of leave, the judge asked? After Wilson v Jaymarke Estates Ltd 
[2007] UKHL 29, it would be very difficult to sustain the argument that the requirement of 
leave ought not to be imposed. There was no justification for Scottish litigants having a 
privileged position, compared to those in other parts of the UK, on such an important matter. 
It is also wrong in principle that a final court of appeal should in some of these cases be at the 
mercy of a litigant’s own decision to invoke its jurisdiction. A hallmark of a final court of 
appeal should be that it retains authority to determine which cases deserve its attention. There 
is only one argument that could be put forward to justify the current position: that we have 
the safeguard that counsel has to certify that the case is worthy of the attention of the House 
of Lords. Often, however, counsel get a fixed view that the case is ‘a winner’ and are happy 
and indeed anxious to certify it.  
Looking to the future 
The judge said that Professors Himsworth and Paterson have argued that the current 
situation—in which there are appeals in civil cases and no appeals in criminal cases—is 
                                                 
7 http://www.commissiononscottishdevolution.org.uk/index.php. 
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actually the least satisfactory of all.8 On the other hand, Lord Bingham in his UCL 
Constitution Unit lecture strongly supported the view that there should not be appeals in 
Scottish criminal matters to a UK Supreme Court.9 It is most unlikely that there will be 
pressure in Scotland for the UK Supreme Court to have jurisdiction in criminal cases. The 
question really is this: in a re-badging exercise, where you simply transfer jurisdiction to the 
new UK Supreme Court, is there pressure that there should be no appeal in Scottish civil 
matters? There is a distinct likelihood of this. It is naive to imagine that there will be no 
change. 
In Scottish appeals, the House of Lords adheres to the theory that it sits as a Scottish court. 
As Lord Advocate Boyd said in a lecture,10 it is committed to preserving the integrity of the 
Scottish system. With the UK Supreme Court, it may be that people’s attitudes will change 
and they will look upon the Supreme Court jurisdiction on a much broader basis. There 
would be a very serious possibility that a UK Supreme Court sitting as the final court in both 
English and Scottish civil appeals will set itself on the path to convergence and ultimately 
assimilation. One reason for thinking this, the judge said,  is the rapid growth of UK-wide 
legal practices. There is an increasing amount of forum shopping by Scottish commercial 
litigants to England and a general acceptance, certainly in the commercial world, that 
uniformity in some areas is not only a possibility but something to be desired. Alternatively, if 
the UK Supreme Court is simply going to be seen as an additional, third-level of appeal court, 
then it becomes less and less obvious why that courts, sitting out with Scotland, with a 
minority of Scottish judges, is worth the disproportionate costs to the public and the litigant. 
This is obviously a big question.   
One option, the judge explained, would be simply to cut off the right of appeal to the UK 
Supreme Court so that the decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session would be final. 
There would be no great novelty in that, because a great many of the Inner House’s decisions 
are already final—in valuation for rating matters, appeals from the Scottish Land Court, 
certain planning matters, and certain other tribunal appeals. 
A second option would be to allow an appeal from the Inner House of the Court of Session to 
a larger division of the Inner House (constituted as a panel of five, seven, nine or eleven 
judges). There are regularly five judge constitutions and they do work very well.   
A third option would be the creation of a Scottish Supreme Court. At the time of the debate 
on the Scotland Bill the Scottish National Party adopted a surprisingly supine attitude on the 
question of House of Lords appeals and there was no agitation on the subject. Then in 2003 
there was a Member’s Bill proposed in the Scottish Parliament to abolish the right of appeal 
to the House of Lords. With every passing day it increases in topicality. The argument, when 
it comes, is if New Zealand and Ireland can have Supreme Courts, why can’t Scotland?  
Reform is not imminent, but that it is significantly closer than it was a year ago. 
Devolution issues and Scottish criminal justice 
The judge also commented briefly on section 57 of the Scotland Act 1998 (see Box 11 above). 
This prevents a Scottish minister from taking any steps that are contrary to Convention rights. 
This section has been seized upon by the Scottish Bar to obtain a route of appeal in criminal 
cases to the Privy Council. This is a result that was never expected and never intended. The 
origin lies in the fact that in Scotland there is only one ground of appeal in criminal cases: 
miscarriage of justice. The argument runs like this: since Article 6 ECHR requires that 
                                                 
8 C Himsworth and A Paterson, ‘A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom: Views from the Northern 
Kingdom’ (2004) 24 Legal Studies 99. 
9 ‘A New Supreme Court for the United Kingdom’, UCL Constitution Unit Lecture Spring Lecture 
2004. 
10 ‘The UK Supreme Court’, Lecture to Law Society of Scotland Conference, 21 January 2004. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/News-Extras/185  
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everyone should have a fair trial, then if there has been a miscarriage of justice, it stands to 
reason that there has not been a fair trial, and there can be an appeal to the Privy Council. 
Exactly where the boundaries lie has not yet been fully clarified in the case law. At ground 
level, this is causing endless trouble by prolonging criminal trials in Scotland. In a period of 
six years, the average length of a contested criminal trial has increased by one complete day. It 
is also causing huge delays in the criminal appeals system.  The problem must sooner or later 
be resolved, the judge said. There has been considerable academic criticism of the 
jurisdiction. There is a question as to whether it was intended to be a transitional arrangement 
because in 1998 (when devolution started) the Human Rights Act had not been brought into 
force. There is a question whether it really is necessary now that human rights are better 
understood and all the main human rights issues in relation to criminal trials have at least 
been canvassed if not fully resolved. The judge concluded by saying that there is every 
likelihood that this question will be opened up by the Calman Commission, which has been 
appointed to review the workings of the devolution settlement. 
Background: leave in Scottish cases  
The question of whether a permission requirement should be introduced for civil appeals from 
the Court of Session was considered during the passage of the Constitutional Reform Bill. 
The UK Government took the view that no change should be made to the current 
arrangements. The July 2003 Department for Constitutional Affairs consultation paper on the 
Supreme Court set out three reasons for not imposing a permission requirement on appeals 
from the Court of Session:11  
‘It could be argued … that it is an unjustified anomaly that citizens in different parts of 
the Kingdom have different rights of access to its highest court. The disadvantages of 
changing this are threefold. First, in respect of Scotland, the arrangement whereby 
Scottish civil cases currently lie to the House of Lords as of right is long established; 
there is no evidence that change is needed; and there are strong arguments for leaving 
the position unchanged. The second disadvantage, in all respects, is that it would mean 
that more of the work of the Court would be absorbed in deciding what cases to hear, 
rather than hearing them. It would lead, in practice, to fewer cases being heard or to 
cases taking longer to come before the Court. The third disadvantage is that it would 
mean that all those seeking the judgment of the Court would have to incur the cost of 
petitioning for the right to appeal.’  
At that time, others took a different view at the time. For example, in her response to the 
DCA consultation paper, Baroness Hale of Richmond stated that ‘There is no justification for 
continuing to discriminate between the Scots and the rest. Everyone should be subject to a 
leave filter’. In 2005, the Law Lords were divided on the point. Some regarded the present 
arrangement as an anomaly that ‘however rarely’ may result in an unmeritorious appeal, while 
others ‘would not wish to disturb a long-standing procedure which gives rise to minimal 
difficulty in practice’.  
Neither the House of Lords select committee on the Constitutional Reform Bill nor the 
Scottish Parliament Justice 2 Committee felt that there was a need to introduce a permission 
requirement. 
The debate on the point has however continued. In Wilson v Jaymarke Estates Ltd [2007] 
UKHL 29—a recent appeal from the Court of Session to the House of Lords—Lord Hope 
commented that the debate on the issue of appeals without a requirement of leave ‘must not 
be regarded as closed’, warning ‘If it is at risk of being abused, the public interest may require 
that the privilege be looked at again’. 
Two main views on the question of leave requirements for Scottish appeals emerged at the 
Queen Mary seminars. A few participants saw no pressing need to alter current arrangements, 
                                                 
11 Consultation Paper CP11/03, para 56. 
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given the relatively small number of cases involved and the political sensitivities in Scotland 
that might surround attempts to legislate on the matter. 
Other participants identified reasons of practicality and principle for change. A Law Lord 
argued that there was ‘a strong case for consistency between Scotland and the rest of the UK’, 
while acknowledging that ‘achieving consistency would be tricky because of traditions and 
constitutional sensitivities’.  He added that two of the recent Scottish appeals heard by the 
House of Lords would not have been given leave had they been from England and Wales—
though one of them turned out to have an interesting and significant point of law.   
Another judge posed the question whether the distinction in relative ease of access to the 
Supreme Court for Scottish litigants and those from other parts of the UK is compliant with 
Convention rights. 
Discussion: criminal appeals from Scotland 
During the passage of the Constitutional Reform Bill12 several people questioned the rationale 
for excluding jurisdiction over the Scottish criminal appeals (including Lord Donaldson of 
Lymington, the Judges Council [of England and Wales], and Baroness Hale of Richmond). 
The Faculty of Advocates in their written evidence to the select committee on the bill did not 
altogether rule out change, but concluded that the case for innovation ‘has not been made 
out’. The Law Lords were opposed to any change: Lord Hope told the select committee in 
2005 that  
‘It is difficult to emphasise how different Scots criminal law is, both in terms of 
substance and procedure. I am not criticising my colleagues in this but I think it is quite 
difficult for them to grasp not just the terminology, which in almost every respect is 
different, but how differently cases are handled, how differently judges deal with cases 
when they sum up at the end of the trial; the whole feel of it is quite different. Without 
having worked in the system and known something about it is difficult to grasp the 
depth of the difference’. 
At the Queen Mary seminars, a judge of the Court of Appeal addressed current arrangements 
on criminal appeals throughout the UK. He said that the reasons for Scottish criminal appeals 
not coming to the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court were historic and one could ask the 
question whether they are justified. We could abolish criminal appeals from England and 
Wales and Northern Ireland—that would make for constitutional tidiness and solve the 
‘judicial West Lothian question’ (in which Scottish Law Lords are involved in deciding 
English criminal law but English Law Lords have no say on Scottish criminal law). He did not 
adhere to that view. A radical re-think was, however, needed about the way criminal appeals 
are dealt with in England and Wales. His proposal would significantly reduce the number of 
English criminal appeals going to the UK Supreme Court (for more on this point, see Part 4). 
A Law Lord expressed concern about calls for the UK Supreme Court’s influence to be 
reduced over Scottish appeals (and indeed over criminal appeals in England and Wales). The 
UK Supreme Court is a UK court. It will deal with UK treaties and UK statues. If a UK 
statute creates an offence, it should be uniformly applied throughout the UK. A recent 
employment case from Scotland (Archibald v Fife Council [2004] UKHL 32) involved an 
important point in the interpretation of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, which is a UK 
Act. There were reasons to be worried about what cases do not get through to the House of 
Lords and the UK Supreme Court. 
Further reading 
Justice 2 Committee of the Scottish Parliament, Report on the Constitutional Reform Bill (27 
May 2004) (accessible at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/justice2/reports/j2r04-04-
01.htm). 
                                                 
12 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitutional Reform Bill Report, paras 220-223. 
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8. The UK Supreme Court: constitutional 
relationships 
The last of the six seminars at QMUL dealt with two broad aspects of the constitutional role 
of the UK Supreme Court. The first is its relationship with the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or ‘the Strasbourg court’)—in 
particular the nature of the dialogue between the courts. Secondly, there was discussion of the 
constitutional context in which the UK Supreme Court had been created and how its 
relationships with Government and the UK Parliament may develop. 
Key issues identified in the seminar 
 There is an effective dialogue between the House of Lords and the ECtHR, which can be 
expected to continue with the UK Supreme Court.  UK judgments are discussed in the 
judgments of the ECtHR, often in detail. In some important cases, the ECtHR has 
responded to criticisms made by the House of Lords in developing the human rights case 
law. 
 The picture in relation to the ECJ is rather different. There is little or no direct 
engagement with judgments from member states’ courts by the ECJ. A developing 
practice was noted in respect of references of questions by the House of Lords for 
preliminary ruling to the ECJ: a short judgment stating the Law Lords’ views on how a 
disputed point of law should be resolved is now, more often than in the past, sent along 
with the question referred. This was regarded as a welcome development which could be 
followed by the UK Supreme Court. 
 A database of judgments from the courts of member states on important points of 
European Union law is needed. The creation of such a database would appear to be more 
likely to stem from national courts working together, or by publishers on a commercial 
basis, rather than being set up by the ECJ. 
 Relationships between the quality of parliamentary scrutiny of executive action and 
proposed legislation on the one hand, and the approach of the courts on the other, were 
debated. An academic put forward a hypothesis that in jurisdictions with relatively 
ineffective legislatures, supreme courts tended to be more activist. Views differed on the 
merits of this analysis and how it might be applied in the context of the UK. 
 Especially among the judicial participants in the seminar, there was a very strong sense 
that there was no reason to think that merely calling the UK’s top level court ‘a Supreme 
Court’, and moving it outside Parliament, would result in the new court being more 
‘activist’ (however that might be defined) than the House of Lords.  
The UK Supreme Court, Strasbourg and Luxembourg  
A practitioner spoke about relations between the UK Supreme Court, the ECtHR and the 
ECJ. 
The Strasbourg court 
When Sir Nicolas Bratza QC delivered the Slynn lecture in 2007, he described what he saw as 
the ‘major and distinctive contribution of the United Kingdom courts’ to the Strasbourg case 
law, singling out the House of Lords. As he put it, ‘national courts have ...made a major and 
distinctive contribution to that case-law—sometimes urging caution when the Court has gone 
too far; sometimes, on the contrary, encouraging our Court to be bolder in its development of 
fundamental rights; but, in every case, enriching the jurisprudence by the clarity and cogency 
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of the analysis of the Convention issues’.13 Although Sir Nicolas did not mention specific 
examples, it is not difficult to think of developments in Strasbourg that were directly 
prompted by the House of Lords—for example, the impact of Barret v Enfield London 
Borough Council (1999) causing the Strasbourg court to row back from its position in United 
Kingdom v Osman (on the compatibility of immunities for public authorities in tort law and 
Article 6 ECHR), the impact of the judgment in R v Spear [2002] UKHL 31 (on courts 
martial), and the impact of Alconbury [2001] UKHL 23 (on Article 6 ECHR and impartiality 
in administrative decision-making). This assistance is particularly welcome when one 
considers the extraordinary overload under which the Strasbourg court is operating. The 
backlog of cases reached 100,000 in the second half of 2007 and continues to increase. 
Meanwhile the 14th Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, which would 
offer some streamlining to the court’s proceedings, remains ineffective because, although 
ratified by every other State, it has not been ratified by Russia. Of course, the great majority of 
cases are declared inadmissible but the court gave more than 1,500 full judgments in 2007—
that is twice the number of 2004 and indeed it is twice the number given in the period 
between 1955 and 1997. So one can understand why the Strasbourg court is grateful for help 
from a national court that has very much more time to consider the issues.  
Should the relationship change? The practitioner said that it does not need to change. The 
jurisprudence of the Human Rights Act 1998 is, it is true, focused to a remarkable extent on 
the Strasbourg case law, as exemplified by the so-called Ullah doctrine. In R (on the 
application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26, Lord Bingham said ‘The duty 
of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no 
more, but certainly no less’. Depending on the side one is on, one emphasises either the ‘no 
more’ or ‘no less’! The merits of that approach may be debated, but if the aim is to influence 
the Strasbourg court, then there is advantage in an approach that is focused on the 
Convention.  
The ECJ 
Turning to European Union law and relations with the ECJ, the practitioner said that 
between UK accession in 1973 and the end of 2007, the House of Lords decided almost 100 
cases substantially concerning European Union law, referring 36 of them to the ECJ. That is a 
respectable proportion of the 434 references made by all UK courts and tribunals. Among the 
very impressive decisions which the House of Lords reached for itself, one can point to R v 
Secretary of State for Employment Ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission (1994) and 
Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [2000] UKHL 33 the judgment (on the 
question whether the First Banking Co-ordination Directive afforded rights to people in the 
position of the depositors).  
All this said, the impact of the House of Lords on the development of EU law has been 
minimal—and that may be putting it kindly. Sir David Edward, when he was a judge of the 
ECJ, was asked to list in an article the British contributions to law and legal process in the 
European Union.14 His role of honour included the British tradition of advocacy, the habit of 
detailed citation of precedent, the approach to the teaching of European Union law, the 
quality of writing about European Law, and the reports of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Communities (as it was then known). But the courts in general 
and the House of Lords in particular, were acknowledged only for the questions they had 
referred for ruling; not for anything they had decided for themselves. Indeed, there has been 
no ‘Euro Pinochet’—a case in which the ruling of the House was eagerly awaited, studied and 
                                                 
13 ‘Winds of Change in the Strasbourg Court’, 17 May 2007 (on-line at http://www.slynn-
foundation.org/main.htm). 
14 ‘The Development of Law and Legal Process in the EU’ in BS Markesinis (ed), The British 
Contribution to the Europe of the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Hart, 2002). 
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imitated across the world. Nor even is there a dialogue as rich as that which has developed 
over a much shorter period between the House of Lords and Strasbourg.  
Is there anything that could be done to render the UK Supreme Court more influential? the 
practitioner asked. It was rather doubtful. The principal obstacle to the emergence of a 
genuine dialogue between the ECJ and national supreme courts is the third paragraph of 
Article 234 EC which, subject to the acte clair doctrine devised by the ECJ requires any 
disputed question to be referred to the ECJ for resolution (see Box 12). The House of Lords, 
like many other national supreme courts, has pushed hard against the limits of the acte clair 
doctrine. To take only one example: the point in issue in Three Rivers District Council v 
Bank of England [2000] UKHL 33 was one on which members of the Court of Appeal had 
expressed different views. But the obligation still remains, which in effect prohibits national 
supreme courts from deciding difficult or controversial of European Union law. The ECJ has 
recently strengthened that obligation by declaring it to be enforceable by infringements 
actions at the suit of the European Commission against a member state and even by claims for 
damages by disappointed litigants. 
Arguments have been advanced for the amendment or repeal of Article 234, but that hardly 
lies in the power of the UK Supreme Court. Is there anything else, looking perhaps at the 
experience of supreme courts in other member states, that might be considered? Only two 
things spring to mind, said the practitioner.  
The first would be for the UK Supreme Court in cases which it does refer to the ECJ, to 
adopt or adopt more frequently, the German and Dutch habit of stating its own views on how 
the disputed questions should be answered.  This course has been very occasionally taken. 
Recently, in West Tankers Inc v RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA (‘The Front Comor’) 
[2007] UKHL 4, Lord Hoffmann, for a unanimous House, explained in no uncertain terms 
why they opposed the suggestion that anti-suit injunctions in support of arbitration clauses 
were prohibited by the EU Regulation.    
BOX 12 ARTICLE 234 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty; 
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the ECB; 
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where those 
statutes so provide. 
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal 
may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request 
the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. 
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State 
against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall 
bring the matter before the Court of Justice. 
The second possibility takes us into altogether deeper waters. Thanks in part to the very clear 
terms of the European Communities Act 1972, the reception of European Union law into the 
legal systems of the UK has been relatively unproblematic. We have not had the struggles 
encountered by the courts of France, Germany, and Italy in the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, if one 
asks which national courts have had the greatest influence on the development of European 
Union law, it has been those courts which have laid down an institutional marker to the ECJ 
and to the other Community institutions as regards the conditions on which they were 
prepared to accept the primacy and direct effect of Community measures. The obvious 
example of this is the development of the ECJ’s fundamental rights jurisprudence as a reaction 
to the threatened rebellion of the German Federal Constitutional Court in its Solange I 
judgment in 1974. Another less known example is the resistance by that some court and 
others to the use of Article 308 EC (formerly Article 235 EC) as the legal basis for which 
there is no specific power in the Treaty to take (see case study in Box 13).  The EU 
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institutions, whether for this reason or not, have become more restrained in their use of 
Article 308 EC. Could anything like this happen in the UK? Mr Justice Laws in Thoburn v 
Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin)—the so-called ‘Metric Martyrs’ case—
having had the German and Danish judgments cited to him, seemed to think so. If such a case 
does arise, it would be a case truly worthy of attention from a ‘constitutional court’ in the UK. 
BOX 13 CASE STUDY ON CONSTITUTIONAL/SUPREME COURT INFLUENCE ON JUDICIAL 
AND LEGISLATIVE PRACTICE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
Article 308 (ex 235) EC 
―If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the 
common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the 
necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commissi6n and 
after consulting the European Parliament take the appropriate measures.‖ 
Brunner v European Union Treaty (‘Maastricht’) [1994] 1 CMLR 57 (Federal Constitutional 
Court, Germany) 
―If to date dynamic expansion of the existing Treaties has been based upon liberal interpretation of 
Article 235 of the EEC Treaty … and upon interpreting the Treaty in the sense of the maximum 
possible exploitation of the Community's powers ('effet utile'), ... when standards of competence are 
being interpreted by institutions and governmental entities of the Community in the future … 
interpretation of such standards may not have an effect equivalent to an extension of the Treaty: 
indeed, if standards of competence were interpreted in this way, such interpretation would not have 
any binding effect on Germany.‖ 
Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR 1-1788 (European Court of Justice) 
―[Article 235] cannot be applied as authority for an expansion of the scope of jurisdiction of the 
Community in excess of the general scope which follows from the provisions of the Treaty as a whole 
... Under no circumstances can the Article be applied as authority for the determination of provisions 
the actual consequence of which is that the Treaty is altered without the prescribed procedure being 
followed.‖ 
Carlsen v Rasmussen (‘Maastricht') [1999] 3 CMLR 854 (Supreme Court, Denmark) 
―Danish courts must rule that an EC act is inapplicable in Denmark if the extraordinary situation should 
arise that with the required certainty it can be established that an EC act which has been upheld by 
the European Court of Justice is based on an application of the Treaty which goes beyond the 
surrender of sovereignty according to the Act of Accession. Similar interpretations apply with regard to 
Community law rules and legal principles which are based on the practice of the European Court of 
Justice.‖ 
Thoburn v Sunderland City Council (‘Metric Martyrs') [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) (Laws LJ) 
―[69] In the event, which no doubt would never happen in the real world, that a European measure 
was seen to be repugnant to a fundamental or constitutional right guaranteed by the law of England, a 
question would arise whether the general words of the 1972 Act were sufficient to incorporate the 
measure and give it overriding effect in domestic law. But that is very far from this case ...‖. 
Discussion on European Convention and EU points 
A Law Lord commented on the relationship between the two European courts and UK 
courts.  One feature of the Strasbourg court’s judgments is how visible their thinking is. You 
can see a dialogue actually going on. For example, the Strasbourg’s judgment in Pretty v 
United Kingdom (2001) which began with a huge quotation from Lord Bingham’s speech in 
R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2001] UKHL 61 and analysed and applied it 
throughout the judgment. Another example is McCann v United Kingdom (2008) on Council 
tenants and Article 8 ECHR, which is based very clearly on Lord Bingham’s minority view in 
an earlier House of Lords case. The advantage the Law Lords have is that we can see what the 
Strasbourg court is saying—in effect ‘tick signs’ against what we said. One is conscious that if 
we were are critical of how the Strasbourg court is framing its judgments and setting tests for 
national courts for national courts to apply, they may pick that up the message and try to 
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refine the tests into something that we can use. For example in Osman v United Kingdom 
(1998)—on the Article 2 ECHR positive obligation situation—is a very clear test that we can 
just adopt and apply. Other decisions remain rather impenetrable. The Strasbourg court 
obviously reads what we say; when they like what we say, they tend to say so; we hope that 
when they do not like what we say, that they are still thinking about it! 
The ECJ is quite different, the judge said. It does not have anything concrete on the face of 
their judgments taken from judgments of member states’ courts. The technique Lord 
Hoffmann used in West Tankers Inc v RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA (‘The Front 
Comor’) [2007] UKHL 4 was used again recently in a case where the House of Lords was 
being asked to construe one of the rulings of the ECJ itself and the House of Lords failed to 
reach agreement and we had to send it back to the ECJ. Lord Hoffmann has set out in fairly 
trenchant terms what he believes is the ECJ was saying in the hope that it may assist them to 
say ‘yes’! There is a mechanism for not actually having a full reference proceeding but in effect 
adopting, by order, what the national court is proposing to do ( Box 14). We are testing that 
in that case by in effect saying that ‘this is how we understand the ruling and we propose to 
give effect to it in this way’. We hope that a full-blown reference will not be necessary. The 
problem remains how relatively invisible the ECJ’s thinking is. The House of Lords has 
moved away from the technique of simply stating a question with nothing attached to it. From 
the ECJ’s perspective, it is probably helpful to have a view from the national court in addition 
to the parties’. 
BOX 14 PROCEDURES INTHE ECJ RELATING TO PRELIMINARY RULINGS 
Article 104 of the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure:   
3. Where a question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling is identical to a question on which 
the Court has already ruled, or where the answer to such a question may be clearly deduced from 
existing case-law, the Court may, after hearing the Advocate General, at any time give its decision by 
reasoned order in which reference is made to its previous judgment or to the relevant case-law. 
The Court may also give its decision by reasoned order, after informing the court or tribunal which 
referred the question to it, hearing any observations submitted by the persons referred to in Article 23 
of the Statute and after hearing the Advocate General, where the answer to the question referred to 
the Court for a preliminary ruling admits of no reasonable doubt. 
4. Without prejudice to paragraph (3) of this Article, the procedure before the Court in the case of a 
reference for a preliminary ruling shall also include an oral part…. 
A practitioner responding by saying that the Strasbourg court does have some advantages 
compared to the ECJ because it always has a full judgment from the last British court, which 
has had to decide the point for itself. The ECJ will normally only have a question from the 
national court. Also in Strasbourg, they are applying the margin of appreciation and are 
prepared to give national authorities, including the courts, some leeway—whereas in the ECJ 
they are declaring what the law is and there is no latitude at national level. 
A Law Lord gave a further example of where the House of Lords, in making an Article 234 
reference to the ECJ, has given a view on the interpretation: a EU Regulation was seeking to 
implement a UN resolution on sanctions against the Taliban and the Al-Qa’ida network and 
the reference stated, in no uncertain terms, what the House of Lords’ view on the 
interpretation in the hope that the ECJ shares that view: R (M) v HM Treasury [2008] 
UKHL 26. 
A judge raised the pragmatic point that it is very expensive to have a House of Lords hearing. 
There has to be hearing before the House of Lords can express even a preliminary view on a 
point of EU law. When a reference is made, the view expressed by a national court must be 
less than ten pages or, if over, it must be précised. The ECJ avoids engaging with national 
courts because their judgments have to be supra-national, acceptable and understandable in 
all member states. Insofar as anyone engages with national courts, it is the Advocate General.  
Another judge supported the developing practice of courts in the UK expressing views when 
they make a reference to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.  
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Another judge suggested an alternative to a short judgment accompanying a reference for a 
preliminary ruling would be for the national appellate courts to summarise relevant domestic 
judgments, rather than leaving this to be done by the Registry of the ECJ.  
Management of information on EU judgments 
A judge of the Court of Appeal said that there was a need for a database to provide better 
information about what decisions are being made in other member states.  
A practitioner responded by saying that he did not sense that the ECJ was very interested in 
promoting a database of that kind, though it was plainly a good idea. He wondered whether 
this might be a project for an organisation of European Supreme Court judges. 
A Law Lord added that such a database would be very useful when a national court is called 
upon to apply CILFIT ruling (see Box 15).  
BOX 15 Judgment of the ECJ in CILFIT, Case 283/81 (6 October 1982) 
The third paragraph of Article [234] of the EEC Treaty—see Box 12 above—is to be interpreted as 
meaning that a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national 
law is required, where a question of Community law is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to 
bring the matter before the Court of Justice, unless it has established that the correct application of 
Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The existence of such a 
possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of Community law, the 
particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial 
decisions within the Community. 
Judicial independence and anxieties about ‘judicial activism’: a Law Lord’s 
observations 
The seminar moved on from ECJ and Strasbourg court matters to consider domestic 
constitutional relationships.  
A Law Lord told the seminar about a paradox that seems to have been present in the 
constitutional reform proposals since they began. Listening to the House of Lords debate on 
the proposals in February 2004, it was clear that there was an idea that the head of the 
judiciary would no longer be a Cabinet minister and that this was seen as not reinforcing but 
undermining the independence of the judiciary.  In that debate and elsewhere, the idea of 
moving the ‘apex court’ out from under the cover or protection of Parliament was also seen as 
not reinforcing but undermining the independence of the judiciary. To anyone outside 
Britain, those two notions would be quite astonishing, but they were very seriously held by all 
sorts of people. In particular, they thought that once the Law Lords were no longer part of 
Parliament, both Government and Parliament would feel freer to criticise the senior judiciary 
for what they did. This was the flavour of those debates. And it was combined with another 
view that once the Law Lords moved out of Parliament, and became a supreme court in name 
as well as essence, we would get Trans-Atlantic ideas above our station. It was put to judges 
appearing before the House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee that both the US 
Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia had become bolder in challenging the 
legislature when they had moved into their own prestigious accommodation. Lord Bingham 
was able to say that the evidence did not bear this out, at least in relation to Australia (which 
in 2004 could not be regarded as an activist court). 
There were even more outlandish ideas in the special issue of the journal Legal Studies 
published in March 2004. Professor Diana Woodhouse suggested that ‘the institutional 
separation could result in the Supreme Court becoming a political institution in its own right, 
in the sense of being subject to lobbying by pressure and interest groups, many of which 
believe that they are more likely to achieve their ends through the court than through elected 
representatives’.15  Moreover, Woodhouse went on to say ‘in the long term, it is possible to see 
                                                 
15 ‘The Constitutional and Political Implications of a United Kingdom Supreme Court’ (2004) 24 
Legal Studies 134 at 144. 
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parliamentary sovereignty being replaced as the defining principle of the constitution by a 
more robust version of the separation of powers and a system of checks and balances which 
recognises the devolved institutions, as well as the Supreme Court, as having a checking 
function on central government.’16  Professor Jeremy Webber went even further: ‘the debate 
over the new Supreme Court has been a shadow debate, purporting to be about the 
independence of the judiciary, but vitiated by its reliance on a superficial and formalistic 
conception of judicial independence and by confusion over the true motive for reform: the 
desire to move the United Kingdom incrementally towards a constitutionally limited political 
order’.17  
So (the Law Lord asked), is the Supreme Court a Trojan horse, leading to an expansion of 
judicial willingness to challenge Parliament and leading ultimately to a written constitution?  
There was nothing (the judge suggested) in anything written or said by those people actually 
instrumental in the policy of creating a UK Supreme Court that leant any support to any of 
those suggestions.   
That said, the House of Lords has changed out of all recognition over the last 30 years. 
During the 1950s and 60s there was hardly any judicial review; hardly any civil liberties; 
hardly any ‘ordinary people’s law’; of course, the words ‘human rights’ never cropped up at 
all. The idea of what the House of Lords was for in the 1950s was quite different from the 
idea of what it is for now. We know what the reasons are: the explosion of judicial review of 
executive action; there is EU law; the Human Rights Act; and there will be devolution cases. 
Devolution cases will turn the Supreme Court into a constitutional court in the proper sense 
of the term. If you put all of those things together, does that mean we will eventually turn 
ourselves into a rather different kind of institution? It is not an adequate answer to that 
question to say that Parliament made most, if not all, of these changes and Parliament could 
take them away. Of course it could! But on the assumption that that is rather unlikely, we 
have to do the job that Parliament has given us for the time being. We have to decide what 
that job is. Does this suggest that on moving across Parliament Square, we should be 
especially cautious for a while? Or should it mean business as usual? Or how long do you give 
us before the storm? 
The UK Supreme Court in the context of the Government’s overall constitutional 
reform agenda: a view from Whitehall 
A civil servant—speaking in a personal capacity—said it would be useful to step back and look 
at the very big picture. The constitutional reform agenda of the Labour administration goes 
back to 1997, with the changes made to the governance of the Bank of England, the 
introduction of devolution, the first phase of reform of the House of Lords, the introduction 
of Freedom of Information legislation, and of course the Human Rights Act. The theme in 
this first phase of reform was very much about democratic accountability and bringing that 
home in some sense— a sense that we are still seeing playing out. An interesting feature of 
that suite of reforms was the provision in the Human Rights Act 1998 that specifically 
retained to Parliament the ability to legislate contrary to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and did not provide the courts with ability to strike down primary legislation. That is 
characteristic of the general tenor of the constitutional reforms having as their theme the 
strengthening of democracy and the re-balancing of power in favour of the citizen.  
The proposals for the UK Supreme Court were introduced as part of the second phase of 
constitutional reform, looking in particular at the relations between the judicial and the other 
branches of the constitution. It is arguable that the Supreme Court proposal was less 
significant than, and arguably consequential on, the changes made at that time to the role and 
office of Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor is no longer the head of the judiciary in 
England and Wales, not a judge, not even a Lord. Taking a Lord out of the Supreme Court is 
                                                 
16 153. 
17 ‘Supreme Courts, Independence and Democratic Agency’ (2004) 24 Legal Studies 55 at 71. 
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a bigger deal than taking the Supreme Court out of the Lords! Now that the role of head of 
the judiciary in England and Wales has passed to the Lord Chief Justice, that is a change of 
very profound significance to the Executive and of fundamental constitutional importance. 
The relationship between the judiciary and Government, now managed on the basis of the 
Concordat drawn up in 2005 and under a Partnership Framework which engages the judiciary 
with decision-making about the resourcing of HM Court Service and the part that judges and 
judicial performance plays in the availability of those resources. Of course, the Lord 
Chancellor remains the minister responsible for the courts, he has a statutory duty to maintain 
the rule of law, and to maintain the independence of the judiciary. In recognition of the 
unique nature of that office, it is important to note that many of the Lord Chancellor’s 
responsibilities may be transferred to other ministers only with the agreement of Parliament 
and not under ‘machinery of government’ changes. 
So the intention behind setting up the UK Supreme Court was to follow through the idea of 
the separation of powers inherent in the changes made to the role of the Lord Chancellor—in 
a way that took account of public expectations about the visible independence and 
transparency of the judicial system. It is important to note how little was understood about the 
role of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. Similar thoughts are being played out 
in debates about the role of the Attorney General. A lot of this is about perception in a world 
where perception translates into constitutional confidence.  
There are, of course, many reasons why we have come to the point of setting up the UK 
Supreme Court. Some commentators have argued that the growth of judicial review of 
executive decision-making has made it particularly desirable to distance the senior judiciary 
more visibly from the political arena. Some have also argued that the ‘policies’ of the human 
rights movement, as opposed to the strict legal requirements of the Human Rights Act, have 
set very high standards for the visible separation of powers.   
If it is correct to say that the place of the Supreme Court, and possibly its future shape and 
characteristics, are highly dependent on how the overall constitutional reform package comes 
to be viewed, then this discussion becomes highly premature because we are still very much in 
the throes of the third wave of constitutional reform. We see the themes of the separation of 
powers and the strengthening of confidence in democracy are being played out to a degree in 
the proposals for a Constitutional Renewal Bill and the wider ‘Governance of Britain’ agenda. 
The top-line theme is very much about strengthening the role of Parliament, particularly as 
against the Executive. There is no evidence in any of this—indeed, evidence to the contrary—
for a view of the Supreme Court as distinctively and inherently more activist than the existing 
House of Lords.  
Discussion of the constitutional position of the UK Supreme Court 
An academic responded to the suggestion that the changes to the Lord Chancellor’s role were 
more significant than the creation of the UK Supreme Court.  Viewed from the perspective of 
2008 that may be so, as the reforms to the office of Lord Chancellor have already been 
implemented and the UK Supreme Court has not yet started work.  Should we take a static or 
dynamic view of the role the UK Supreme Court is going play?  A rather wild comparative 
speculation may help (he tentatively suggested). One could look at three models: the High 
Court of Australia, the Canadian Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of New Zealand. 
(He deliberately ignored the US Supreme Court model as it is so utterly different in every 
respect). He posed the questions: are these courts activist or deferential, and why? The 
Australian High Court is not activist; the Supreme Court of Canada is very activist; and it is 
unknown whether the Supreme Court of New Zealand is activist given it only became 
independent in 2004. 
What are the reasons why some courts are more activist than others?, the academic asked. 
One theory much touted in the media is that sometimes the courts are substituting or 
compensating for the failings of Parliament. Putting it simplistically: if Parliament is 
ineffective in curbing the Executive’s abuses of power, then the courts step in to fill that 
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vacuum.  In Canada, the Parliament is pretty supine; both Houses are less effective than their 
opposite numbers in the UK.  In Australia, the Parliament is weaker in the House of 
Representatives but stronger in the Senate (which takes an interest in constitutional matters). 
The New Zealand Parliament was ineffective and dominated by the Government until 1996 
when the system changed; Parliament is much more effective now as a result. The question is 
whether the top court in the UK will be tempted to become more activist? 
A civil servant said that the Labour administration’s constitutional reform programme as a 
whole acknowledges that there are areas where Parliament could do better.  That was being 
addressed by strengthening the role and powers of Parliament. That is why any nexus between 
the ineffectiveness of parliaments and the willingness of the courts to step in may perhaps not 
be so closely correlated in the UK context—the Executive having said that they recognise this 
and are doing something about it. The difficult question is always ‘who says Parliament is 
ineffective—who has the legitimacy to make that judgement?’ That is where the difficult area 
is. It would not be surprising if, after the last 30 or 40 years, the Executive said that was not a 
call of the courts. It will be interesting to see whether this sense of context percolates through.   
A Law Lord asked: what is the mechanism to achieve that? How can you stop the courts being 
approached by litigants? The courts are demand-led. If someone brings a case to us, which we 
have the jurisdiction to hear, we have a task to perform. How can the courts be excluded?  It 
could lead to a very real struggle if the Executive tries to persuade Parliament to put down 
some form of block. 
The civil servant responded by saying that it was not a case of a block being put down as such. 
There were two things that could be imagined. One is the general interpretive approach by the 
courts, bearing in mind the legislative context. That may sound vague and high-level, but that 
is not the same as saying that it has no impact. The other is to see where this is going to end 
up. We can do no more than speculate at the moment. Thinking is still very, very live. It is 
quite interesting if you think about pieces of legislation like the Human Rights Act and the 
Freedom of Information, which have effectively colonised by statute areas that were previously 
operated on a discretionary basis and which had therefore been subject to judicial review on 
an open-textured basis. What we are seeing is a codification of the direction of travel: the 
checks on the Executive set down in statute. It would not be surprising to see this continue 
into other areas. 
A judge commented that the cynic may say that the Executive would rather give power to 
Parliament, because they could control Parliament in a way they cannot control judges.   
A Law Lord said that the Law Lords simply do not have cause to think in any given challenge 
whether this was a case where Parliament had been supine or ineffective. The Law Lords are 
there to ‘audit the performance of the law’ (to use a phrase of Lord Bingham’s): to decide 
whether a case has been lawfully dealt with hitherto. No doubt if Parliament is supine and 
ineffective, that will throw up more unlawful decisions and more vulnerable legislation. That 
is the only relationship. 
A civil servant said it may be useful to consider what might be meant by the terms supine or 
ineffective.  It may be taken to mean that Parliament has failed to legislate and specify what it 
wants to see done in a particular area, so leaving it open to the courts to work that out. Or, 
that Parliament has legislated in an extremely open-textured sort of way, so inviting the courts 
to fill in the detail. These are areas where Parliament has some choices it can make. 
Another judge said that there was nothing particularly new in all this. You can trace a whole 
series of bits of legislation where the courts interpret it in a way that does not appeal to the 
Government, and the interpretation is followed by an amendment or some re-framing of the 
legislation.  The courts are not trying to be activist or ineffective; they are simply trying to 
respond to a point raised by a litigant. 
A judge said that the key point is whether we can foresee a time when the UK Supreme Court 
holds that an Act of Parliament is unconstitutional and should be struck down. We are so 
inbred in the country with the idea that Parliament is supreme that it is unlikely that the 
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courts would strike it down.  However, he also did not foresee that the courts’ powers would 
be narrowed in some way. The civil servant responded by saying that in a way, the courts’ 
powers are narrowed every time there is an incursion of statute law into an area previously 
unoccupied by legislation. 
An academic said that we can see in the two rounds of litigation over anti-terrorism legislation 
what the respective roles of Parliament and the legislature are.  He explained that the 
legislation was passed in 2001; the first challenge by the House of Lords was in 2004 which 
declared part of the Act (on detention without charge or trial) incompatible with the ECHR.  
There then ensued what Canadian jurists might call a ‘dialogue’ because the Executive sought 
to legislate once more in order to control suspected terrorists—and that went to the courts 
again. The idea of Parliament being ‘supine and ineffective’ could be refined: in the House of 
Commons, a Government with a majority will normally get its way; but the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights produces very detailed reports on whether bills comply with Convention 
rights, which are taken very seriously particularly in the upper House. So it is not as crude as 
saying that there is a political institution (Parliament) confronting a legal one (the courts).  
A different judge asked how, given the tasks allocated to the judiciary which involve 
challenging Parliament—both by the European Communities Act 1972 (which is crystal clear) 
and in the Human Rights Act 1998—how do we go about doing that? New questions come up 
all the time. There is a case at the moment about how ‘the Convention right’ are defined. We 
can answer that in a variety of ways. How far does the Ullah statement go in leaving it to the 
ECtHR to define them? How much of the definition of ‘the Convention rights’ is for the 
courts, and how much is for Parliament? This is a big question not defined in the Human 
Rights Act at all. That is a good example of a question that Parliament has given the Law 
Lords to decide. There are bolder and less bold answers to that.  
A judge of the Court of Appeal gave an example of the House of Lords filling the void left by 
Parliament: the issue of termination of life support. Fifty years ago, perhaps less, the courts 
would have left it to Parliament. He went to repudiate the use of the word ‘activist’.  He 
suggested that doing nothing in the face of something that needs to be done is a very ‘activist’ 
stance indeed. The 1930s was a greatest period of parliamentary inertia. A weak and 
ineffective Government led to the growth of power not in the judiciary but in the civil service. 
In times of a strong Parliament, judges saw themselves being faced down in public, which was 
a breach of the unwritten rules of the separation of powers. The Human Rights Act and the 
Freedom of Information are very different.  He explained that the Freedom of Information 
can be likened to machinery that is constitutional and the courts are really in the role no more 
than engineers whose role is to ensure that it runs smoothly.  The Human Rights Act is 
different; it introduced to the law a series of open-textured one-liners which it was the job of 
the courts to give life and body to.  That is a constitutional project of a very serious order. 
This was a better example of constitutional confidence. 
An academic spoke about the distinction between Parliament and the Supreme Court.  The 
best example is India where the Supreme Court is too activist and unrealistic in its judgments.  
Is it not the case (and this is really a psychological question) that one’s self image as a judge 
will change after the creation of the UK Supreme Court? You—the judges—will see 
yourselves in terms very distinctively as a third branch of the State.  You will be more 
conscious as to what you may suggest by way of law reform to the other two branches.  
Because you will have devolution issues, will you not be much more conscious of your 
constitutional role? 
A judge responded by saying that it is a funny idea that being in the House of Lords should be 
holding the Law Lords back, pressing us down and making us less prepared to do the job than 
we will feel when we are across the square. The judge did not foresee feeling any different. 
A practitioner said that those who appeared before the Appellate Committee do not get a 
feeling that the Law Lords are ‘holding back’ from telling the Government that they are in 
breach of constitutional principles.  It was difficult to see why that should change. It is a 
truism that the approach of judges must be affected by the constitutional principles and 
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traditions in the country where they are operating. Those principles are well developed in the 
UK. They will no doubt continue to evolve but we are not talking about a radical change, just 
people moving geographically who are the same people, all of whom who have been judges 
and who are therefore imbued with the ethos of how a judge behaves. They are going to be 
governed by exactly the same laws—in particular the European Communities Act and the 
Human Rights Act—and all the precedents to be applied will remain the same. The concern is 
not that there will be greater activism but that in order to demonstrate to people outside that 
there is no greater activism, the Supreme Court may —not doubt unintentionally— hold back 
in what it would have said had it remained in Parliament. 
An academic commented that the much of the discussion had been based on a sense of 
‘what’s in a name?  What’s in a place?’.  There appeared to be a strong sense among the Law 
Lords present at the seminar that just because the court will be called a Supreme Court and 
not located inside Parliament will not mean that things will be done in any different way. 
There was no sense that the UK Supreme Court will turn into a ‘real’ supreme court with  
powers to strike down primary legislation. 
Further reading 
B Dickson (ed), Judicial Activism in Common Law Supreme Courts (Oxford: OUP, 2007)  
D Anderson, ‘The Law Lords and the European Courts’ ch 9 in A Le Sueur (ed), Building 
the UK’s New Supreme Court: National and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford: OUP, 2004) 
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The Rt Hon Lord Hope of Craighead   
The Rt Hon Lord Rodger of Earlsferry    
The Rt Hon Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe    
The Rt Hon Baroness Hale of Richmond    
The Rt Hon Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood    
The Rt Hon Lord Mance   
The Rt Hon Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury   
 
The Rt Hon Lord Judge  
The Rt Hon Sir Anthony Clarke 
The Rt Hon Sir Mark Potter   
The Rt Hon Sir Mark Waller   
The Rt Hon Sir Stephen Sedley  
The Rt Hon Dame Mary Arden DBE  
The Rt Hon Sir John Dyson   
The Rt Hon Sir Andrew Longmore   
The Rt Hon Sir Robert Carnwath CVO  
The Rt Hon Sir Rupert Jackson  
Sir Ross Cranston FBA   
 
The Hon Lord Gill  
Academics 
Richard Cornes, University of Essex   
Dr Penny Darbyshire, Kingston University  
Professor Brice Dickson, Queen’s University, Belfast 
Professor Janet Dine, Queen Mary, University of London 
Professor Gavin Drewry, Royal Holloway, University of London 
Professor Robert Hazell, UCL 
Professor Andrew Le Sueur, Queen Mary, University of London 
Professor Kate Malleson, Queen Mary, University of London 
Professor Dawn Oliver, UCL 
House of Lords 
UK Supreme Court 
Court of Appeal and High Court 
in England and Wales 
Lord Justice Clerk and President of 
the Second Division of the Inner 
House, Scotland 
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Practitioners  
Barristers were invited following contact with the main specialist bar groups, including the 
Constitutional and Administrative Bar Association (ALBA), the Bar European Group, the 
Chancery Bar Association, Commercial Bar Association (COMBAR), Criminal Bar 
Association, Family Law Bar Association, and the London Common Law and Commercial 
Bar Association (LCLCBA). 
David Anderson QC  
Charles Béar QC   
Margaret Bowron QC   
Richard Clayton QC  
Malcolm Davis-White QC   
David di Mambro 
Richard Gordon QC 
Christopher Grierson, Lovells  
Stephen Grosz, Bindman & Partners 
Javan Herberg   
Simon James, Clifford Chance 
 
Ali Malek QC   
Stephen Nathan QC   
Sally O’Neill QC   
David Pearson, Treasury Solicitor’s Department 
David Pannick QC   
Vikram Sachdeva     
Rabinder Singh QC   
Michael Smyth, Clifford Chance  
Jemima Stratford   
Lucy Theis QC   
James Turner QC   
 
Others 
Rowena Collins Rice, Ministry of Justice   
The Rt Hon Sir Terence Etherton, Law Commission 
Stephen Foot, Ministry of Justice 
Louise di Mambro, Registrar of the UK Supreme Court   
Senior Master Peter Hurst 
Kenneth Parker QC, Law Commission 
Diana Procter, Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England & Wales 
Jenny Rowe, Chief Executive of the UK Supreme Court 
Master Roger Venne, Registrar of Criminal Appeals   
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